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Indeed, even a rate of return that seems generous for existing companies may 
discourage entry into the industry. Third, inventors may spend much more on 
invention, anticipating that these greater expenses will not only increase the chance 
of success, but also increase the amount that they can charge. This Article assesses 
recent literature proposing cost-plus patent damages, and it offers a simulation 
model to assess the magnitude of these problems. It concludes that while these 
problems are serious, social welfare still might be increased by considering cost­
plus damages as a factor in the patent damages calculus. I. IntroductionGovernmental mechanisms for rewarding innovation generally do not require direct assessments of the cost of the research and development (R&D) undertaken. The exceptions prove the principle that the government is wary of making individualized assessments of whether research spending is wasteful. Research-and� development tax credits effectively allow partial reimbursement of research costs, 1 but these are available to all inventors, requiring no analysis of whether private firms have spent their money well.2 The government must police for fraud,3 but within broad contours even inefficient research spending is subsidized. Because such tax credits will not cover anywhere near the entire cost of R&D, private actors have strong incentives to spend their money wisely. Meanwhile, government research grantors may consider the expected cost of future research activities as part of their analysis of the overall promise of research plans,4 but this is but one factor in an open-ended inquiry.5 And once grants are issued, recipients enjoy some flexibility in reworking budgets. 6 Grantees are often constrained less by the detailed research plan than by the desire to produce strong results and earn future research grants. The cost of conducting research plays even less of a role in the patent system. An inventor can receive a patent even if the invention required little work, so long as the general requirements of patentability are met. Indeed, the section of the United States patent statute reqmnng that inventions be nonobvious explicitly requires that "[p ]atentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the I.R.C. § 41(a) (2012).2 See, e.g., Daniel Heme! & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REv. 303, 311-12 (2013) (discussing the effect of tax credits on inventor incentives). 3 See, e.g., United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1461 (10th Cir. 1987) (prosecuting defend­ants for creating false tax deductions on non-existent R&D payments). 4 See, e.g., NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, PROPOSAL AND AWARD POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GUIDE 67 (2017) (requiring financial and administrative reviews as a condition to funding). 5 Government research grantors consider many factors, including the qualifications of the research team, the strength of the rationale underlying the research proposal, and the social value of a suc­cessful outcome. See id. at 63--64. 6 See, e.g., Joshua Sarnoff, Government Choices in Innovation Funding (With Reference to Climate 
Change), 62 EMORY L.J. 1087, 1094 (2013) (noting that outputs ofR&D are not measured with re­spect to specific spending inputs). 
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invention was made,"7 whether through diligent effort or through serendipitous
discovery.8 Indeed, the provision was added to the patent statute to overrule case
law requiring a "flash of genius" as a condition for receiving a patent.' Our
historical system was antipathetic to the inventor who incurred great costs to
produce an invention, and even today the inventor receives no special consideration
for making large investments. The theory is not that costs are irrelevant, but that the
government should monitor outputs rather than inputs.1" Private parties will have
incentives to invest in research activities that are likely to produce new inventions.
If the government is capable of determining what is sufficiently new but not so
good at measuring the cost of producing innovation, this theory is sensible. A patent
system, the theory continues, need not even require the government to assess
invention value, because inventors will naturally steer their efforts to producing the
most valuable inventions as cheaply as possible.
Yet in two critical doctrinal areas, patent law necessarily requires more
governmental attention. First, while the law of nonobviousness does not consider
cost explicitly,11 it is a doctrine that filters out easy (and thus cheap) inventions.12
An invention that "would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed
invention pertains" cannot receive a patent.13 Even if the courts approach this as an
epistemic inquiry, resisting direct tallying of costs,' 4 obvious inventions will
generally be cheap inventions. The Federal Circuit, exploring whether an invention
should be considered "obvious to try,"1 5 has stressed the relevance of the "ease and
7 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
8 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 16 n.8 (1966) ("[I]t is immaterial whether [the inven-
tion] resulted from long toil and experimentation or from a flash of genius."); General Tire & Rub-
ber Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 F.2d 1105, 1118 (6th Cir. 1973) ("The present statute
emphasizes the proposition that it makes no difference as to patentability by what manner an in-
vention is made."); Sbicca-Del Mac, Inc. v. Milius Shoe Co., 145 F.2d 389, 394 (8th Cir. 1944)
("It is of no consequence, whether the thing 'be discovered by accident, or by long, laborious
thought, or by an instantaneous flash of mind."').
9 The patent statute overturned a "flash of creative genius" requirement set forth in Cuno Eng'g
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941). See also DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM
ON PATENTS § 5.02 (providing a history of § 103).
10 For a model that gives special consideration to costly inventions, see Matthew Erramouspe, Stak-
ing Patent Claims on the Human Blueprint: Rewards and Rent-Dissipating Races, 43 UCLA L.
REv. 961, 975 (1996).
For a proposal that nonobviousness doctrine should take into account cost, see Glynn Lunney, E-
Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REv. 363, 413 (2001).
12 Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J.
1590, 1613 (2011).
13 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
14 For an argument that the nonobviousness doctrine should adopt an explicitly economic foundation,
see Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 12, at 1590.
'5 See generally KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007) (suggesting that the
"obvious to try" test is appropriate when the field is sufficiently limited to present a finite number
of potential solutions).
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predictability" of the techniques for accomplishing the invention. 16 Thus, the
nonobviousness doctrine can be viewed at least in part as an inquiry into how much
one would expect it to cost to complete an invention.
Second, the patent system may not care about the value of the invention when
assessing obviousness, but it does care when assessing patent damages. 7 In many
cases, this is not necessary. A patentee can receive injunctive relief for
infringement, 8 and then the government need not make an assessment of the
invention's value. But patentees will also seek monetary relief for past
infringement.19 Moreover, since the Supreme Court's decision in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L. C.,2 courts are hesitant to grant injunctions, especially when an
invention may represent a small component of a large product.2 When a potential
user of a patent knows of a patent, can confirm its validity, and negotiates in
advance, the possibility of an injunction should yield a price that allows the inventor
and user of the invention to share in the surplus of the invention. But when a user
has inadvertently made irreversible investments without knowledge of the patent, an
injunction can allow the inventor to hold up the user for a much larger amount.22 In
limiting the opportunity for such holdups, eBay effectively requires the courts to
determine, among other things, how valuable the invention was to the user. The
problem is most acute for non-practicing entities, which as an empirical matter are
often limited to money damages. 23
Nonetheless, neither the nonobviousness doctrine nor patent damages
considers how much it cost the patentee to complete the invention. With
nonobviousness, such consideration arguably is barred by statute,24 and the
emphasis on a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art25 emphasizes that
the courts are considering expected, rather than actual, ease of invention. With
damages, the cost of completing the invention is not one of the many factors that the
courts use in calculating damages.26 In an article prepared for last year's version of
16 See In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
17 See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable
Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1661, 1678 (2010).
18 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012); see, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (granting a permanent injunction with a sunset period after finding patent infringement).
19 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
20 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
21 Mike Heins, Selling Congress on eBay: Should Congress Force the ITC to Apply the eBay Stand-
ard?, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 589, 593 (2013).
22 See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REv. 1991, 2008-10 (2007).
23 See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical
Study, 101 IOWA L. REv. 1949, 1970-71 (2016).
24 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 16 n.8 (1966) (holding that the degree to which the pa-
tentee toiled in completing the invention is irrelevant).
25 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); see also Joseph P. Meara, Just Who Is the Person Having Ordinary Skill
In The Art? Patent Law's Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REv. 267, 273-78 (2002).
26 See Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (listing
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this symposium, however, Ted Sichelman argued that the patent system should
explicitly consider risk-adjusted R&D costs in calculating damages. 27 That is, a
patentee would be entitled to recover its R&D investments. Just as the goal of
nonobviousness might be thought to be to provide exclusivity only when necessary
to induce the invention,28 so too might the goal of patent damages be to provide just
enough compensation to induce investments. Because research is an inherently risky
activity, to motivate inventors to engage in research, these costs would be adjusted
upward to compensate for risk. Damages would be calculated so that an inventor's
total recovery (extrapolating to the entire market, not just the individual patent
defendant) would make the research project as attractive ex ante as the inventing
finn's next best investment. Sichelman proposes only that risk-adjusted costs should
be a factor in the patent damages calculus,29 but he hints that they could serve a
larger role if initial experimentation were successful.3" In a separate article in the
same symposium, John Golden and Karen Sandrik also briefly consider the
possibility of incorporating cost considerations into the reasonable royalty
assessment.31
Reimbursement of inventors based on their costs similarly could play a role in
reward alternatives to patent systems. The proposals for patent system alternatives
that have gained prominence in the past two decades have focused on the challenge
of determining how much to value inventions procured by such systems.32 The
classic prize approach is to offer a fixed prize for a particular invention sought by
the prize sponsors, with the prize presumably to be paid even if the problem turns
out to be much simpler than expected.33 Reward proposals, meanwhile, have sought
to compensate inventors in proportion to their diverse contributions but many have
still sought to estimate invention value.34 Some proposals seek to measure the
demand for the invention directly,35 while others seek to piggyback on the patent
factors relevant for calculating damages for infringement).
27 See Ted Sichelman, Innovation Factors for Reasonable Royalties, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 277,
308-11 (2018).
28 See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 12, at 1678-79.
29 See Sichelman, supra note 27, at 311.
30 See id. at 323-324 (arguing that patent law should use a reliance damages regime based on R&D
expenditures).
31 See John M. Golden & Karen E. Sandrik, A Restitution Perspective on Reasonable Royalties, 36
REV. OF LITIG. 335,371 (2017).
32 See generally Michael Abramowicz, Prize and Reward Alternatives to Intellectual Property,
1 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Peter S. Men-
ell, David L. Schwartz & Ben Depoorter eds., forthcoming 2018).
3 See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property versus Prizes: Refraining the Debate, 81 U. CHI.
L. REV. 999, 1001-02 (2014).
14 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 225-35 (2003)
(discussing factors that inform patent-prize proposals); AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, THE
HEALTH IMPACT FUND, MAKING NEW MEDICINES AVAILABLE FOR ALL 3 (Incentives for Global
Health, 2008).
3 See, e.g., Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44
J.L. & ECON. 525, 531-32 (2001).
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system to determine what an invention would have been worth if it remained under
patent protection instead of receiving a prize. 36 Recognizing that some inventions
may make contributions that cannot be measured in direct sales, and also that some
inventions may benefit individuals who cannot pay nearly the prices that inventors
would charge,37 some other reward proposals have endorsed valuation systems that
take into account more general improvements to social welfare.38 Despite this wide
range of approaches, proposals have been unified in focusing on inventive
contribution rather than on the cost of invention.
In a recent article, however, Hannah Brennan and coauthors (including Amy
Kapczynski) defend what can be seen as a reward system that uses a cost-plus
accounting metric.3 9 In particular, Brennan et al. advocate that the government take
advantage of statutory authority to purchase generic versions of certain medicines
for less than 1% of their list price plus a reasonable royalty.4" Brennan et al. note
that exercising such a power could be analogous to eminent domain,41 which prior
advocates of reward systems have urged as a tool that could allow the government
to take patents for just compensation,42 effectively converting the patent system to a
reward system. The key challenge for such a system is determining what constitutes
a "reasonable royalty." Brennan et al. suggest that a baseline might be set based on
the price charged by the infringer,43 but that an award should deviate from this
baseline to allow for recovery of risk-adjusted R&D costs.' Even if the government
does not have perfect information, so long as the government gives sufficient
compensation on average, there will be sufficient incentive to invent.
Under some assumptions, a patent or reward system should be able to function
equally well either with an approach that aligns inventor returns with the value of
innovations produced or with an approach that reimburses the risk-adjusted cost of
producing those innovations. Potential inventors will monitor changes in the
36 Michael Kremer, for example, suggests an ingenious system of auctions that would result, with
high probability, in a patent being sold to the government for an amount equal to or a multiple of
the market's valuation of the patent. See Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for En-
couraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. EcON. 1137, 1146-48 (1998).
37 See, e.g., Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, And Access to Essential Medicines: A
Long Way From Seattle to Doha, 2 CI. J. INT'L L. 27, 28-29 (2002) (describing the barriers patent
protections impose on drug access and affordability in developing countries).
38 Amy Kapczynski, The Continuum of Excludability and The Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900,
1954 (2013).
39 Hannah Brennan et al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent
Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH 275, 310-18 (2016).
40 See id. at 275.
41 See id. at 308-10.
42 See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Patent Fences and Constitutional Fence Posts: Property Barriers to
Pharmaceutical Importation, 15 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 623, 672 (2005).
43 Brennan et al., supra note 39, at 314. Note that Brennan et al. implicitly assume that the infringe-
ment is by a company that sells to users rather than by users themselves. For simplicity, the model
in Part IV of this paper adopts the reverse assumption, focusing on users as potential infringers.
44 Id. at315.
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expected cost of inventing and the expected value of an invention, and they will
invent (or try to) as soon as the expected cost drops low enough or the expected
value rises high enough so that the portion of value that the inventor can appropriate
will cover the risk-adjusted costs.45 If expected costs and value change slowly over
time, then invention will occur at the same time regardless of whether a cost metric
or a value metric is used to provide ultimate rewards. Thus, at least placing aside the
complications of calculating various types of damages, on this theory, it should not
matter whether damages are based on valuation or on cost.
In practice, however, expected costs may drop abruptly, following an
exogenous improvement in technology,46 and more rarely, expected value may
increase abruptly, as a result of an exogenous change in demand.47 When this
occurs, it is possible that the expected cost of an invention will be considerably
lower than its social value. Indeed, the expected cost may even be much lower than
the proportion of value that the inventor can appropriate from a patent, if
injunctions are available or if damages are based on the patent's value. It is in this
case that cost-plus damages have the theoretical potential to increase social welfare.
So long as cost-plus damages truly compensate for risk, an inventor will still have
sufficient incentive (just enough incentive) to pursue the invention. Meanwhile,
lower damages mean that prices will be lower for consumers, producing less
deadweight loss. This may produce both efficiency and distributive gains.
The possibility of reducing unnecessary compensation for inventions is the
heart of the case for cost-plus damages. But considering cost in the patent damages
calculation can be justified on more prosaic grounds as well. Even if one believes
that the ultimate purpose of patent damages is to measure the value of a patent to
the infringer (or to users to whom the infringer sells the product), the cost of
producing an invention may be a proxy for patent value. Easier inventions, all else
being equal, will be less valuable than harder inventions; after all, if an invention
were easy and valuable, then it probably would have been invented early. So, if cost
is a proxy for value, then even if value is the concepttial touchstone of the patent
damages inquiry, then it likely deserves at least some weight in the multifactor
calculus.48 Multifactorial balancing tests can be unwieldy,49 but it is hard to see the
harm in extending a test that already considers many factors to considering one
15 For an article modeling the implications of inventors' waiting to invent until the value from inven-
tion is sufficiently high, see John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI.
L. REv. 439, 459 (2004).
46 See, e.g., Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 12, at 1676 (invention dependent on a newly discov-
ered research tool could not have been invented earlier).
47 See id. at 1676-77 (citing the recently felt needs for security products following the Sept. 11 terror-
ist attacks and for filtering the red color band in night vision goggles as exogeneous changes in
demand).
48 See Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
49 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation
and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 773, 783 (2011).
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more.5" At least in some cases, there may be firm evidence about cost-plus damages
and so this may be a good proxy for patent value.
Yet there is a strong argument that this is backward-that expected cost indeed
should be seen as the ultimate touchstone of the patent damages inquiry. On this
account, the inquiry considers factors that seem more related to value because
expected cost is too hard to measure directly. A risk-adjusted cost measure presents
a number of evidentiary challenges. The most obvious of these is how we might
determine the ex ante probability of success. This assessment requires
decisionmakers to place themselves in the position of inventors at some prior point.
A more serious concern is that decision making might be systematically biased.
Empirical studies suggest that hindsight bias affects jurors in analyzing
nonobviousness,51 and the same might be true with cost-plus patent damages. This
produces a more serious concern still: If inventors anticipate that decisionmakers
will be infected by hindsight bias, they might believe that patent damages will be
just a bit short of the level needed to compensate them for their investments. If
patent damages focus on invention value and courts slightly underestimate that
value, there will be a little bit less invention; but a systematic downward bias in
estimating risk-adjusted costs could lead to a lot less invention. If one expected the
courts never to allow enough damages to reimburse costs, then one would invent
only if there were sufficient nonpatent incentives to do so.
There would, of course, be a simple remedy if risk-adjusted costs were
systematically underestimated. Damages could be augmented by some percentage,
enough on average to at least compensate for systematic bias. So long as the social
value of an invention will generally be considerably higher than its expected cost,52
the patent system could be generous in setting this percentage, hoping to guarantee
inventors that they will receive no less than their risk-adjusted costs. But this
exacerbates an entirely different risk: excessive spending. Suppose an inventor
anticipates that it would cost $1,000,000 to have a 50% chance of invention. But if
the inventor anticipates that successful investments are generally reimbursed at 10%
more than is needed to compensate for risk-adjusted costs, then the inventor's
incentive is to invest more than $1,000,000. After all, 10% of $1,000,000 is less
than 10% of $10,000,000. A higher investment might only marginally increase the
probability of invention, but no matter. An inventor who expects to receive a risk-
adjusted reimbursement of a specific amount should not care about the probability
50 See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement,
94 CALIF. L. REv. 1581, 1614-15 (2006) (discussing how only some core factors are determinative
in the outcome of multifactor tests because judges sway other factors to follow the outcome point-
ed to by core factors).
5 Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstrations that the Hindsight Bias
Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 01o ST. L.J. 1391, 1403-15 (2006).
52 Inventions are often thought to have high spillover benefits beyond what patentees can recover.
See, e.g., Kremer, supra note 36, at 1146 (describing the ideal patent buyout price as the social
value of an invention, assuming the expected social benefit exceeds the cost).
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anyway. This is a familiar problem with cost-plus pricing from other domains in
which it is used, such as utility regulation53 and government contracting.5 4
Thus, cost-plus damages introduce the danger that inventors will spend too
much from a social welfare perspective. There remains, however, a critical restraint
on reimbursement: Users might refuse to use the invention, at least unless they can
negotiate a lower price. If the inventor spends a billion dollars on an invention, then
a potential user who values it at a million dollars (even one with a billion dollars to
spare) will not intentionally infringe if patent damages doctrine would impose a
damages verdict with nine zeros. Thus, excessive spending on inventions will push
up anticipated damages, thus vitiating the supposed principal benefit of cost-plus
damages, but such a system will not lead users to pay more than they would if a
victorious patentee could receive an injunction. Meanwhile, even courts measuring
investments might count some excessive investments in research as not being
investments at all, so there would be some limit on padding expense accounts. And
if a little bit of gold-plating performs the same function as offering inventors some
percentage above the minimum expected to be compensatory, then it could be
beneficial on balance.
In short, the empirical effects of cost-plus damages are unpredictable. Different
effects push in different directions from a welfare perspective. It seems unlikely that
there will be opportunities for empirical analysis of cost-plus damages anytime
soon. In the absence of data, this Article will seek to theorize as clearly as possible
about these various effects of cost-plus patent damages. Part II will review recent
proposals for cost-plus damages and highlight three central concerns: First, it is
difficult to adjust for risk. Second, it is implausible to allocate the costs of entering
into an industry across individual projects, yet these costs must be reimbursed if
cost-plus damages are not to discourage entry. Third, cost-plus damages may lead to
gold-plating-socially excessive research expenditures.
These problems notwithstanding, Part III will accuse the proponents of
excessive modesty. If cost-plus damages work as the proponents anticipate, they can
serve as much more than small tweaks. Properly functioning cost-plus damages
have profound implications for patent doctrine, perhaps eliminating the need even
for cornerstones like the nonobviousness doctrine and the patent term. Part IV will
offer a simulation model that indicts the proponents of cost-plus damages for
excessive optimism. It shows how cost-plus damages could be beneficial but also
how slight misestimates of key parameters could lead to considerably worse
outcomes than with standard approaches to damages. Finally, Part V concludes.
53 See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 9-10 (1986) (describing a prudence test, which would allow for cost-plus utility
regulation so long as costs are kept to a minimum).
51 See, e.g., Robert C. Guell & Marvin Fischbaum, Toward Allocative Efficiency in the Prescription
Drug Industry, 73 MILBANK Q. 213, 223 (1995) (discussing how the defense department and
NASA's use of cost-plus pricing caused projected costs to increase).
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Though there is an insufficient basis to switch to a patent damages system
exclusively based on cost-plus damages, there is room for doctrinal experimentation
with cost-plus damages as part of the broader analysis.
H. The Theoretical Case for Cost-Plus Damages and Rewards
The theoretical case for cost-plus damages can be made modestly or
ambitiously. This Part will start with the modest recent proposals for cost-plus
accounting, pointing out the core of the arguments, the limited direct application of
these arguments, and some initial potential difficulties.
A. Brennan et al.'s Cost-Plus Eminent Domain
Brennan et al.'s proposal55 is modest in several ways. First, the authors do not
suggest any needed modifications to patent doctrine or indeed to the law more
broadly, but instead only that the executive branch exercise an already existing
statutory power.56 Second, the authors' suggestion is limited to a particular area of
technology, pharmaceuticals,57 despite the potential for the statute to be applied in
other technological fields. And third, the authors do not suggest that their approach
be applied to all inventions in this field, but only for the relatively narrow area of
life-saving technologies.58
The problem that Brennan et al. target is what they characterize as the high
cost of life-saving medicines. They focus specifically on direct-acting antivirals,
and even more specifically on sofosbuvir, one form of which the FDA has
designated as a Breakthrough Therapy.59 This drug offers promise for the treatment
of the blood-borne virus HCV (Hepatitis C), but most versions of the medicine have
a list price of nearly $100,000 for a standard course of treatment.6" Even with
discounts, many patients are unable to obtain the treatments. 61 Meanwhile, payors
who can afford the treatment have used a significant percentage of their budgets on
the treatment, thus reducing their ability to help patients with other problems. 62 The
example is thus a vivid illustration of the familiar tension between dynamic and
static incentives in innovation law. 63 Given the existence of a treatment, lower
prices would benefit patients, but at least with some medicines, the ability to charge
5 See Brennan et al., supra note 39, at 283 (suggesting methods by which the government could use
§ 1498 to extend public access to generic medications).
56 Id. at 302-03.
I d. at 319.
58 Id.
'9 Id. at 287-89.60 Id. at 290 tbl. 1.
61 Id. at 291.
62 Id. at 292.
63 See generally Thomas Cheng, Putting Innovation Incentives Back in the Patent-Antitrust Interface,
Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 385, 388-90 (2013) (discussing the short-term conflict between pa-
tent law's dynamic incentive focus and antitrust law's static incentive focus to achieve the com-
mon goal of improving consumer welfare).
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high prices may have been necessary to induce the R&D of the drug, including the
high cost of clinical trials.64
Brennan et al.'s innovation is their suggestion that the United States
government take advantage of a statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1498,65 which provides that
when the United States uses a patented invention without a license, the patentee's
sole remedy shall be "for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation." 66
The statute also covers use "by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, firm, or
corporation for the Government and with the authorization or consent of the
Government. '67 Brennan et al. review legislative history confirming that the statute
authorizes the United States to exercise its power of eminent domain to use patented
inventions, subject to the traditional requirement to pay just compensation. 68 The
statute, Brennan et al. note, has been used in a variety of contexts, for example
when the Treasury Department used it to immunize banks from liability for use of a
patented invention on the detection of fraudulent checks.69 In the pharmaceutical
context, Bayer cut the prices of its antibiotic ciprofloxacin after the Secretary of
Health and Human services threatened to import generic versions during the anthrax
crisis in 2001.70 Brennan et al. also describe an earlier episode that led
pharmaceutical companies to seek to limit the statute to cases of national security
emergency, an effort that failed.7
Brennan et al. recommend that § 1498 should be invoked when the federal
government determines that "drug pricing has created sizable deadweight loss.72
They qualify this statement, however, by identifying two primary factors: first,
whether "firms command rents in excess of risk-adjusted R&D costs plus a
reasonable profit,"7 3 and second, whether there would be a significant "magnitude
of potential public health gain. '74 The first of these qualifications highlights that
Brennan et al. are not concerned with deadweight loss simpliciter. Drug prices
could be high because of high risk-adjusted costs, meaning either that the research
itself was expensive or that it was highly unlikely to succeed ex ante. Indeed, the
authors allow that with rare diseases, "high prices may be justifiable because firms
must spread R&D costs over a much smaller patient population."75 While allowing
6 Brennan et al., supra note 39, at 293.
65 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2017).
66 Id. § 1498(a).
67 Brennan et al. note that the provision governing subcontractors was extended in 1942. Brennan et
al., supra note 39, at 300 (citing Act of October 31, 1942, 77 Pub. L. No. 77-634 § 6, 56 Stat.
1013, 1014).
68 See Brennan et al., supra note 39, at 299-302.
69 Id. at 302 (citing Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 583 F.3d
1371, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
7 Id. at 303.
71 Id. at 305.
72 Id. at319.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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that government guidance might be needed to make application of these factors
predictable,76 Brennan et al. conclude that "new HCV treatments satisfy both factors
and are a prime candidate for government use."" The government, however, likely
would not need to invoke § 1498 in many contexts because the mere possibility of
such invocation would lead companies to lower their prices.78
The crux of the Brennan et al. proposal is their recommendation for calculating
damages. They recommend starting with a royalty representing the infringer's
earnings. In the case of pharmaceuticals with low marginal cost, this would be a
"very low baseline."7 9 Thus, the more important aspect of their proposal is their
recommendation that "these rates should be grossed up to ensure adequate
incentives for innovation."8 This gross up appears to encompass several
components. First, it reflects the actual cost of R&D." Second, it would adjust for
the risk of failure.82 The authors cite general statistics on the probability that new
drugs will succeed in various stages of clinical testing, such as the 20% probability
that a drug will advance from Phase II to III testing.83 The authors recommend using
"inputs specific to the drug or drug class in question" to determine failure rates.
84
Third, inventors would be entitled to "'reasonable' profits, perhaps keyed to
approximate average industry returns."85 Fourth, courts could "even incorporate an
additional margin to compensate for the risk of error in their R&D assessments."86
And fifth, the courts might prorate damages "to reflect the proportion of the global
market that these payors represent."87
In theory, this approach should work. If pharmaceutical companies are earning
far more than needed to compensate them for their investments, taking into account
the possibility of failure, then there is no reason for them to earn any more.
Deadweight loss should be reduced, and there may be distributive benefits to
improving patients' welfare at the expense of shareholders'. In practice, the success
of the approach depends on the government's ability to measure the relevant
parameters accurately. The most difficult parameter to estimate is likely to be risk.
In the case of HCV, the authors confess lack of knowledge of the relevant risk and
76 Brennan et al. suggest that while courts could calculate damages, it would be better for agencies to
"establish guidelines that will shape any bargaining around the courts' powers, thereby influencing
courts' calculations and reducing uncertainty about how courts would assess damages." Id. at 326.
71 Id. at 320.
78 Id. at 321.
79 Id. at 315.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 316 (recommending that courts "estimate R&D outlays").
82 Id. ("Before investing $1, for example, a company will require a potential profit of $2 if there is a
50% risk that the product it is developing will fail.").
83 Id. (citing Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of
R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 24 tbl.2 (2016)).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 315.
86 Id. at 315-16.
87 Id. at 317.
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thus assume a number based on industry averages. "We lack specific information on
risk of failure for these drugs, so assume a 10 to 20% chance of success (with the
lower bound of 10% representing the general likelihood a drug that begins trials
succeeds)."88
If pharmaceutical companies expect the government to make similar
assumptions, then they will not develop any drugs when they estimate less than a
10% chance of success. The allowance of profits and an error margin is designed to
offset the risk that the government might underestimate risk-adjusted costs, but it is
at least plausible that the government might underestimate even considering this.
Today, a pharmaceutical company might invest in a drug with a 5% chance of
success if the rewards-in lives saved and ultimately in profit-were sufficiently
high, but this will not occur if the pharmaceutical company expects the government
to estimate no less than a 10% rate of success (unless the profit and error margins
amount to more than 100%). Given an expectation of standard patent damages,
sufficiently high social value will ultimately trigger invention for any cost and
probability of success, but basing eminent domain damages entirely on cost and
probability of success means that social value cannot serve this function.
The 10% success figure seems particularly inappropriate because it represents
a crude empirical measure of average success. If that is the average, then some
drugs presumably are developed even though pharmaceutical companies anticipate
a much lower probability of success, while others have a higher degree of success.
This highlights the stakes. If pharmaceutical companies expect the government to
underestimate risk significantly in a world in which § 1498 is used aggressively,
they may simply not develop a drug, regardless of the value of the drug. To be sure,
the United States is just one market, but if the United States fails to give drug
manufacturers a sufficient return for its prorated portion of the global market, then it
seems unlikely that the manufacturers will get a sufficient return anywhere else
either.
In a reward system that focuses on invention value, when an invention's value
is underestimated, inventions that are of marginal social value will not be
developed. But the Brennan et al. proposal is premised on the idea of converting
inframarginal inventions-those that will surely be developed under the current
system because the profits are so large-into marginal ones. So the danger that
expectation of a risk misestimation would lead to nondevelopment of a drug
becomes much greater. On the other hand, if they succeed, deadweight loss can be
reduced without any harm to innovation incentives.
The deadweight losses from high pricing must be balanced against losses from
drugs that might not be developed if potential innovators expect the government not
to provide sufficient compensation to allow for profit. With zero marginal costs and
linear demand, deadweight loss destroys one-fourth of the total potential surplus
88 Id. at 329.
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from an invention. 89 The failure to invent a drug that could be invented destroys the
entire surplus from the invention. Moreover, this ignores the possibility that drug
development may have beneficial spillover effects that the inventor cannot capture.
This can occur when other companies develop "me-too" drugs" and more
importantly once drugs enter the public domain. Thus, risk estimates must be
sufficiently favorable to inventors so that the probability of discouraging invention
is much lower than the probability of some unnecessary deadweight loss.
The case for § 1498, and by extension for a reward system that seeks to
reimburse risk-adjusted R&D costs in any technological domain, thus depends on
whether the government can be expected to make its estimates sufficiently
accurately or sufficiently generously that the profit and error margin it allows will
be enough not to dissuade even a small percentage of inventions. Part IV will return
to this question by assessing how the government might improve its ability to make
such estimates sufficiently well. Brennan et al., however, reasonably might answer
that surely, the government could take the sofosbuvir-based drugs with a very
generous payment that would without question provide sufficient return. After all,
they emphasize that the drug has "likely already earned around forty times the cost
of developing the drugs." 9 1 They thus conclude that "society has already vastly
overpaid for the drugs, particularly considering how little treatment the $36 billion
expenditure has purchased."92
Looking at this drug in isolation, their case indeed seems persuasive. Yet this
persuasiveness is undermined at least somewhat by a familiar economic puzzle. If
huge returns are available that greatly overcompensate pharmaceutical companies,
why isn't there more entry into the market? There are at least two possible answers
to this puzzle. The answer at which Brennan et al. hint is that there is a great deal of
entry-indeed, an excessive amount of entry. "Reducing the profits available for
blockbusters could even increase dynamic efficiency," they write, "because outsized
rewards can induce wasteful racing wherein parties expend more effort to be first to
obtain a reward.. .than society gains from their race."93 Under standard industrial
organization theory, rents must be dissipated in some way. For example, John Duffy
offers a model of patent racing in which racing efficiently produces earlier
invention and earlier entry of inventions into the public domain.94 Yet even in
Duffy's model, the number of entrants into a patent race may be inefficiently high.
'9 See Abramowicz, supra note 34, at 162 fig.2.
90 See, e.g., Albert Wertheimer et al., Too Many Drugs?: The Clinical and Economic Value of Incre-
mental Innovations, in 14 INVESTING IN HEALTH: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF HEALTH
CARE INNOVATION 77, 78 (Irena Farquhar et al. eds., 2005) (arguing that me-too drugs provide pa-
tients with valuable choices).
91 Brennan et al., supra note 39, at 328.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 322.
9' See Duffy, supra note 45, at 464-75 ("Racing to patent earlier (and thus to have the patent expire
earlier) will therefore continue to be the predominant mechanism by which firms compete away
the patent rents.").
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The Brennan et al. approach thus might be seen as a technique for reducing
inefficient patent races. Perhaps the government will lower returns just enough so
that only one or two firms will race to develop a drug that suddenly seems
obtainable. In some circumstances, this might lead to only a slight reduction of the
probability of invention or a slight delay in the date of invention.
The second answer to the puzzle is much less favorable to the Brennan et al.
thesis. This answer is that rent dissipation occurs not only at the stage when R&D
on a particular drug is conducted, but also at an earlier stage when entrepreneurs
create pharmaceutical companies that have the institutional capability to conduct
drug research and to market the drugs. A challenge in applying the Brennan et al.
approach is that costs incurred even before a specific drug candidate is identified
ought to be risk-adjusted as well, at least if their system is designed to be something
other than an appropriation of pharmaceutical company wealth. But it may be very
difficult to determine how to allocate these costs among projects and how to risk-
adjust these expenses. One would need data not just on pharmaceutical companies
that succeed, but also on those that fail. One would need to account for the
possibility that the pharmaceutical company might have never produced a single
successful drug as well as the possibility that the company might have produced
some successful drugs but not enough to pay a market return to the initial investors.
Some venture capital and other early forms of investment reflect very high failure
rates, and thus the risk-adjusted costs inherent in these initial investments may be
quite high. Failure to take them into account will discourage new companies from
entering into the market in the hope of someday becoming a big pharmaceutical
company.
There is another potential objection to the Brennan et al. approach that is quite
different. Might the government overcompensate pharmaceutical companies?
Perhaps the government might take a drug as a political favor to a pharmaceutical
company that has contributed to the campaign. Of course, Brennan et al. highlight
that the government should act only in the fact of great deadweight loss, but there is
at least some danger that the government, once using this power, might abuse it.
This potential leads to rent-seeking behavior of a different sort,95 as pharmaceutical
companies seek to influence the government in its exercise of the power. Indeed, the
danger might be less that the government would pay too much in individual cases as
that the legislative and administrative processes might be perverted so that the
government would pay systematically too large a sum. One can advocate for a
system with particular rules, but must also face the prospect that any actual
implementation of a proposal may be quite different from what has been
recommended.
9 See generally Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking: The Problem of Definition, in TOWARD A THEORY OF
THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 97, 97-112 (James Buchanan et al. eds., 1980) (developing a theory
of rent-seeking in politics).
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If that is a danger, there is an argument that cost-plus damages should be used
not as a tool when the government takes a patent, but instead as part of the patent
damages calculation itself. Patent litigation is adversarial, and this should reduce at
least the risk of excessive compensation of patentees. The traditional justification
for a reward system as an alternative to the patent system is that it can reduce
deadweight loss. The government exercising its § 1498 powers might well sell
drugs at marginal cost, thus achieving this goal. But reluctance to raise taxes and
spending may help explain the failure of reward systems to become more prominent
than they are today. If the program is to be revenue neutral, then the government
would need to pass its expenses along to consumers. This could still represent a
dramatic decrease in deadweight loss by eliminating unnecessary
overcompensation, but in principle a patent damages system could achieve much
the same end. To see this, let us turn to Ted Sichelman's proposal.
B. Sichelman's Cost-Plus Damages
Sichelman's goal is not to create an alternative to the patent system but to
reform the calculation of patent damages. Calculation of damages is necessary
where an injunction is not fully compensatory, because infringement occurred
before the issuance of the injunction,96 or where an injunction cannot be entered, for
example because the invention is a small component of a product and there is a
danger that an injunction would allow the patentee to "hold up" the infringer.97
Although patentees who lose profits can receive lost-profits damages, it is difficult
to prove lost profits,98 and so many practicing entities and all non-practicing entities
have damages calculated on the basis of a "reasonable royalty."99 The goal in a
reasonable royalty case is for the court to reconstruct the hypothetical agreement
that the parties would have reached on a licensing price.' 00
The canonical reasonable royalty case, still influential in the Federal Circuit,10 1
is Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. 102 This case creates a multifactorial
96 See, e.g., Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding
that a patentee should be awarded damages for pre-injunction infringement).
97 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 22, at 2009 ("[H]oldup is of particular concern when the patent
itself covers only a small piece of the product, as is common in the industries in which so-called
patent trolls predominate.").
98 Id. at 2017.
99 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (requiring that at minimum, an infringer pay the patent holder "a reasona-
ble royalty for the use of the invention").
100 See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("The 25
percent rule of thumb is a tool that has been used to approximate the reasonably royalty rate that
the manufacturer of a patented product would be willing to offer to pay to the patentee during a
hypothetical negotiation.").
101 See, e.g., Astrazeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., 782 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (indicating that
the district court "employed the so-called Georgia-Pacific factors, the set of 15 factors drawn from
the frequently cited opinion in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.").
102 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub nom. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-
Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
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balancing test. Placing aside two factors that are not so much factors as overarching
philosophy and procedural guidance, 103 Sichelman groups the factors into four
categories: first, whether the patentee is a practicing entity;1" second, the benefit
provided by the technology over preexisting technologies; 10 5 third, the extent to
which profit "should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented
elements";10 6 and fourth, actual negotiations between either the patentee and other
licensees or between the infringer and holders of similar patents.10 7 We might
loosely group all of these factors into one even larger category, representing the
value provided by the invention. An invention, at least if the thrust of Georgia-
Pacific is accepted, is more valuable when its inventor practices the invention, when
it represents a large technological advance, when it accounts for the success of
products incorporating it, and when the market would ordinarily reward it with a
high licensing price.
Sichelman offers a thorough critique of Georgia-Pacific. It may be
unpredictable, especially because different courts will place different emphasis on
different factors.0 8 It may be especially difficult to apply to multicomponent
products, leading to "the so-called royalty stacking and apportionment problems."'0 9
Juries may not have the cognitive capacity to apply the test effectively, °" 0 yet jury
damages are generally upheld even if the basis for them is not clear."' Meanwhile,
the portions of the test considering market royalties are circular, since those
royalties are set in anticipation of what the courts will decide." 2 Jonathan Masur has
shown that this can create a vicious cycle; if judicially calculated damages are too
low, royalty rates in anticipation of levied damages will fall, and that will make
judicially calculated damages fall in turn.' Sichelman also critiques reforms that
seek to improve the courts' ability to gauge value. He agrees, for example, that the
goal should be to assess a patent's contribution over prior art, but this can be
difficult to assess "when the value of the invention turns on increased consumer
demand,""' 4  and especially when an invention is incorporated into a
multicomponent product.
103 Sichelman, supra note 27, at 283 (discussing a factor that explains that the test is designed to mim-
ic a hypothetical negotiation and a factor that allows expert opinion to be used).
104 Id. at 283-84 (discussing factors three through six).
o Id. at 284-85 (discussing factors eight through eleven).
106 Georgia-Pac., 318 F. Supp. at 1120; Sichelman, supra note 27, at 285-86 (discussing factor 13).
107 Sichelman, supra note 27, at 286 (discussing factors one, two, and twelve).
108 Id. at 287.
109 Id. at 288; see, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 22, at 2025-29 (describing case studies that
"document examples of the royalty seeking problem outside the litigation context in the develop-
ment of new technologies within a standard-setting organization").
l10 Sichelman, supra note 27, at 289.
1 Id. at 289 (citing Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
112 Id. at 290-93.
113 See Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, 110 Nw. U. L. REv. 115, 116
(2015) (describing the dual trends of increasing patent litigation and decreasing damages awards).
114 Sichelman, supra note 27, at 295.
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To promote his argument that patent law should focus on the risk-adjusted cost
of inventions rather than on the value those inventions provide, Sichelman argues
that the conceptual foundation of patent damages doctrine is flawed. Patent law, he
argues, follows traditional tort law in seeking to return a victim to the status quo
ante.115 Patent law, however, "is not designed to remedy private wrongs," but "to
promote innovation." '116 Compensatory damages may be excessive from a social
welfare perspective "when a patent covers a minor component of a complex
product," '117 when patent rewards are far in excess of what is needed to induce
invention,118 and when infringement resulted from valid (if ultimately rejected)
questions about "whether a given patent is infringed, valid, or enforceable."' 19 In all
of these situations, it may be appropriate to grant a patentee not what it would have
received if a negotiation had been completed, but an amount sufficient to
compensate for the costs of innovation.
As a remedy, Sichelman suggests incorporating cost considerations into the
patent damages calculus. A court, he argues, should "examine the actual costs-
R&D, commercialization, and related opportunity costs--of the invention at
hand."12 Sichelman recognizes that R&D costs must include not only wages, but
also "amounts for materials, equipment, and facilities that can be allocated to work
on the patented invention." '121 Commercialization costs, meanwhile, include not
only marketing, but also "clinical and safety testing, pricing analysis, and other
costs directly related to transforming the invention into a commercial product." '22
Finally, Sichelman insists that costs include "opportunity costs," i.e., the next best
investment that a patentee could have made as an alternative to the patented
product. 123
Like Brennan et al., Sichelman recognizes the need to adjust for risk. Indeed,
the approach that he recommends for performing the risk adjustment is similar:
"Using retrospective cost accounting from survey data from multiple
pharmaceutical companies, the average cost at each pre-clinical and clinical phase
can be calculated., 124 As noted above,1 25 this is potentially problematic. Risk may
differ greatly from one project to another. If the average risk is the measure of risk
for which inventors expect to be reimbursed, then inventors simply will not
undertake inventions that have a high risk. Sichelman does note that the
examination can be "more fmne-grained," taking into account different risks at
115 Id. at 297-98.
116 Id. at 298.
117 Id. at 301-02.
118 Id. at 302-03 (focusing especially on software patents).
"9 Id. at 304.
120 Id. at 309.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 309.
123 Id. at 310.
124 Id. at 311-12.
125 See Brennan et al., supra note 39, at 317.
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different stages and the specific type of relevant invention.126 But there is still ample
room for debate about the size of risk, and it is hard to know whether courts will
tend to overestimate or to underestimate risk.
Even at a conceptual level, it is not easy to define the risk that one is
estimating. The pharmaceutical example simplifies matters. A firm engages in a
high-risk research project that either will produce a blockbuster drug (in the sense
that many individuals would be willing to pay a great deal for it if unable to get it
cheaper) or will fail. But in many inventive contexts, and even with
pharmaceuticals, any project may lead to a number of different possible inventions,
and any invention will have a distribution of potential success levels. A research
project might "succeed" in earning a patent (or two) yet interest a much smaller
number of consumers than expected or cost much more than expected to
manufacture or require marketing expenses so great that the project would not have
been worthwhile ex ante.
Thus, the court needs to know the distribution of potential success levels.
Moreover, the court needs to know how this distribution changes at the time of each
investment the firm makes, so that it can take account of changing success levels as
a project moves closer to market. But even knowing all of these distributions does
not resolve the court's inquiry. Cost-plus damages will meaningfully lower patent
damages relative to alternatives only for the relatively successful portion of the
distribution at each point in time. For relatively unsuccessful outcomes, cost-plus
damages will be in excess of customers' willingness to pay. Willingness to pay will
then be the limiting factor on profits, at least assuming those customers have
adequate notice of the invention and negotiation occurs ex ante. Thus, the court's
challenge in the cases in which the invention is successful is to reduce damages
enough so that ex ante, the inventor would have had an incentive to undertake the
investment, taking into account that in some cases, the inventor would be able to
recover some fraction of its costs.
1 27
One advantage of Sichelman's proposal over Brennan et al.'s, however, is that
even if courts are expected to underestimate risk, the effect may be only marginal.
This is because Sichelman suggests only that cost be one factor in the patent
damages calculus, and thus its effects will operate largely on the margin. But
Sichelman hints at the possibility that the use of cost-plus damages could be
increased in the future. 128 And Brennan et al.'s proposal in principle could be
adjusted so that cost is just one factor in the eminent domain inquiry as well. The
problem remains that once cost is a sufficiently large factor in the calculus,
investors will forego projects where they expect that the courts will substantially
underestimate risk, even if the net social welfare benefits of those projects are
expected to be high.
126 See Sichelman, supra note 27, at 312.
127 Id. at 324.
128 Id. at 323-25.
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Just as Brennan et al. allow for reasonable profits and a margin of error, so too
might underestimation of risk be a relatively small concern if the courts are
generous in determining opportunity costs, and thus the interest rate that the courts
will permit the patentee to receive on its risk-adjusted costs. Sichleman recognizes
some problems with determining opportunity costs, however. In particular, there is
a danger of circularity. 129 For many inventive entities, the opportunity cost is
another project that also might result in the grant of a patent. But if that is so, the
value of that alternative project would also depend on the structure of cost-plus
damages. The inquiry thus becomes recursive and intractable. Measuring risk of the
project at issue is hard enough; measuring risk of the best project not undertaken is
a fool's errand.
Sichelman does not suggest scrutinizing the hypothetical next best project.
Rather, Sichelman suggests that if a "firm requires an internal rate of return of 30%
to perform such projects over time," then it should receive compensation for this
internal rate of return.13 ° But how would we know what rate of return a firm
required? Presumably, we could look at how successful a firm's other projects are.
But what if this is a firm's first project? And what if the firm has many projects, but
all expect to be rewarded based on cost-plus damages? The circularity problem re-
emerges. A firm might decline to undertake good projects because it wants courts to
think it has a high internal rate of return. Moreover, if a firm believes that a court
likely would underestimate the internal rate of return, then it may decide not to
undertake certain projects that in fact are above its internal rate of return.
This analysis suggests that internal rate of return may not be the relevant
concept. Indeed, one can make an argument that the relevant return is the return
provided by a risk-free asset or close to that level. In principle, the risk that a
particular research project will fail is idiosyncratic risk,"' and so with well-
functioning securities markets, this risk can be eliminated in a diversified
portfolio.'32 Even if the risk is not entirely idiosyncratic-perhaps multiple firms
will run into similar problems-the correlation of the risk with the market as a
whole will be low, and so only a small interest rate should be necessary to induce
investment.
But this argument has two problems. First, one can defend the idea of an
"internal rate of return" on the basis that a successful company will not undertake
marginal projects with slightly-above-market rates of return, because those projects
129 Id. at 314.
130 Id. at 310.
131 See, e.g., Kevin G. Bender, Giving the Average Investor the Keys to the Kingdom: How the Feder-
al Securities Laws Facilitate Wealth Inequality, 15 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 1, 17 (2015) (explaining the
concept of idiosyncratic risk).
132 See Lee Drucker, A Financial Perspective on Commercial Litigation Finance, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. &
Bus. 665, 671 (2016) ("Idiosyncratic risk is asset-specific risk that has little or no correlation with
the market and can be mitigated by diversification.").
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may distract the firm from higher-return projects.133 Thus, at least implicitly, risk-
adjusted patent damages must compensate for these distraction costs. Second, firms
are run by agents whose human capital is undiversified, and these agents will not be
willing to undertake risky projects absent sufficient compensation. Cost-plus
damages must take into account the salaries these workers require, but once they
receive these salaries, workers may steer a firm in the direction of low-risk projects
if high-risk projects do not provide a significant premium above what the market
offers.
Thus, cost-based patent damages are likely to be more feasible if courts (or the
legislature) simply pick a rate of return, or perhaps a few different rates of return
based on crude factors such as industry. The rate of return must be one that will
almost always be sufficient to compensate for the risks of development. This rate
also should perform the function of Brennan et al.'s error margin. 134 That is, it must
be high enough so that a firm that expects courts to underestimate risk will
nonetheless think that the rate of return is so attractive as to compensate for such
underestimation. Because the social costs of a decision not to engage in a research
project as a result of expected underestimation of risks are much greater than the
social costs of deadweight loss,135 this will need to be a considerable rate of return
indeed. The optimal rate will necessarily still allow for some false negatives-
inventions that will be abandoned at loss of social value. But the cost of such false
negatives is much greater than the cost of such false positives, so we must increase
the permissible rate of return to a level where they will be quite rare. Developing an
empirical model for figuring out the optimal rate may be quite difficult, and picking
too low a rate could reduce innovation, while picking too high a rate might reduce
the advantages of the cost-based approach or even increase deadweight loss.
It should be much more straightforward for the courts to estimate the costs
incurred in the inventive process than to estimate either the needed rate of return or
the level of risk faced by a particular firm. Indeed, one of the strengths of
Sichelman's proposal is that costs are real numbers, backed by accounting, rather
than hypothetical constructs. Yet even here there are risks. As with the Brennan et
al. proposal,136 there is the challenge of allocating costs across research projects that
those costs may promote. Inventors will have an incentive to argue that costs were
incurred in connection with a patented project rather than in conjunction with other
projects producing different revenue streams. Especially when products incorporate
133 See generally Roy J. Epstein & Alan J. Marcus, Economic Analysis of the Reasonable Royalty:
Simplification and Extension of the Georgia-Pacific Factors, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
555, 560 (2003) ("The IRR can be compared to the cost of capital to indicate project profitability.
This is particularly useful in a royalty analysis because the documents in the litigation often al-
ready provide information on the cost of capital and the IRR of the infringing project.").
134 See Brennan et al., supra note 39, at 316 ("[Clourts could... incorporate an additional margin to
compensate for the risk of error in their R&D assessments.").
135 See Abramowicz, supra note 34, at 125-26.
136 See supra Part H.A. (discussing the difficulty of allocating entry costs).
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patented and non-patented elements, or incorporate many different patents, these
allocations will not be easy. A particular challenge involves allocating costs in
creating an enterprise or in expanding it that must be amortized over a number of
different projects. If the courts underestimate the proportion of these costs that
should be attributed to a particular project, they will reduce incentives to enter the
technological field, though not incentives of existing market participants to engage
in invention.
An additional concern is that inventors may spend excessively. It may seem
that it should not matter whether costs are reasonable, so long as they are genuinely
undertaken to advance the project. In ordinary circumstances, after all, inventors'
incentives in determining how much to invest are at least correlated with the public
benefit from the invention that might result. An inventor that invests more is more
likely to win a patent, while an inventor that invests less saves money. But with a
cost-plus damages regime that reimburses all costs, the calculus changes. If the
inventor concludes that there is a sufficiently high chance of winning the patent to
make any investment worthwhile, then the inventor might as well invest more. If the
permitted rate of return is attractive, then every dollar invested will return
considerably more than a dollar if the inventor is successful, so the inventor might
as well invest as much as possible.
Investing more will increase the inventor's chance of winning. But oddly, this
is a neutral consideration, since a higher chance of winning should produce a lower
risk adjustment. The benefit of the investment is simply the greater return in the
event the inventor wins the patent. A potential remedy is to limit the inventor to
only reasonable investments. But that is not easy to define. Is it reasonable to hire
ten scientists instead of five? To pay the president of the firm (who may also be the
owner) an especially high salary? There are no easy answers to these questions. In
principle, what ought to matter is the expected cost of invention. Even at a
theoretical level, however, this is an elusive concept. If investing $1,000,000 would
produce a 50% probability of invention, and investing $5,000,000 would produce a
100% probability of invention, is the expected cost $2,000,000 or $5,000,000?
Moreover, focusing too much on expected costs vitiates the virtue of being able to
focus on the actual costs spent by an inventor.
There are, however, at least three possible answers to this objection. First, the
courts might use actual costs spent as a baseline for assessing risk-adjusted costs,
but reserve the right to raise or lower the costs should they seem excessive. While
this would trigger difficult questions about reasonable investment, inventors
anticipating this might restrain their investment at least somewhat. Second, there is
at least some limit on the amount of money that inventors can spend. Cost-plus
damages serve effectively as a damages cap, but not as a damages floor. Users can
always stay away from the invention, and so a patentee can only expect to recover
high costs if the invention is valuable relative to the needed costs of production.
Third, high spending may not be all bad. Because inventors can appropriate only
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some of the benefits of their inventions, they ordinarily might have incentives to
spend too little.
III. Reform Possibilities for Patent Law
The various criticisms that Part II has levied at the admittedly ingenious
proposals to use cost-plus accounting either for providing rewards for patents taken
by eminent domain or for patent damages might be reduced to two broad yet
opposite concerns. The first concern is about the possibility of undercompensation.
The concern is not just that costs are difficult to calculate; virtually any
methodology for determining patent damages will have its challenges. The concern
is that even a slight shortfall in expected risk adjustment may lead to the failure to
engage in research projects that would surely be undertaken in the traditional patent
system. The only plausible way to respond to this concern is to offer a very
substantial premium in the return permitted successful patentees, though this
naturally reduces the benefit of cost-plus accounting. The second concern is that of
excessive compensation. Conditional on the invention being produced, this may not
make things any worse for users, who can still negotiate lower prices. But it reduces
the benefit of cost-plus accounting still more. Moreover, the problem of excessive
compensation does not simply cancel out with the problem of insufficient
compensation. Compensation can be excessive because cost-plus damages caused
excessive spending on research, yet simultaneously insufficient because the risk
adjustment was too low.
If the cost-plus damages proposals were mere tweaks to patent law, these
practical problems would probably be sufficient to doom them. But they should not
be disregarded so easily. While the dangers of cost-plus damages are substantial, the
potential benefits, should it be possible to overcome these problems, are high as
well. This section imagines that the courts could develop a well-functioning patent
damages doctrine based entirely on cost-plus accounting, substantially responding
to the concerns raised here. In that case, cost-plus damages would have the potential
to revolutionize patent law. Cost-plus damages solve a number of distinct problems
of the patent system and thus could lead to a patent system that looks quite different
from the patent system of today. In particular, there would be no need for a
nonobviousness doctrine or even for a patent term. Patentable subject matter could
be relaxed, and patent scope would become much less important.
A. Nonobviousness
The nonobviousness doctrine, as noted in the Introduction, is designed to avoid
giving intellectual property rights unnecessarily. The Supreme Court in Graham v.
John Deere Co. casts the problem this way,' 37 and John Duffy and I have argued
137 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966) ("The inherent problem was to develop some
means of weeding out those inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the in-
ducement of a patent."). The Court's language is infelicitous, as the Court's point was that the
nonobviousness doctrine would filter out those inventions that would have been devised and dis-
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that whether a patent is needed to induce an invention should indeed be the
touchstone of the nonobviousness analysis. 138 But even if one accepts our argument
that a focus on inducement improves the administrability of nonobviousness
doctrine, that doctrine has an unavoidable limitation: it is binary. Inducement, by
contrast, is not binary. Even absent a patent system, most inventions would be
invented eventually, and so the question is how much the patent system accelerates
invention. 139 Even a properly functioning nonobviousness doctrine guided by the
inducement standard will leave two problems: First, when a patent is granted, it may
provide more protection than is needed to induce invention. Second, the absence of
patent protection for inventions that will be invented soon anyway means that there
may be no incentive to accelerate those inventions.
In principle, cost-plus damages can fix these problems. First, cost-plus
damages eliminate the problem of excessive protection by restricting rents. An
invention that is borderline nonobvious will no longer provide the patentee with a
windfall. Second, with properly functioning cost-plus damages, there is little
downside to granting a patent on a relatively trivial invention. So long as the
patentee is limited in the damages it can recover to the risk-adjusted costs incurred,
the deadweight loss associated with the patent grant will be correspondingly low.
The principal harm from a patent on a relatively obvious invention is that it may
allow damages well above cost recovery and thus impose substantial deadweight
loss, but cost-plus damages would limit recovery to risk-adjusted costs.
It might seem that a patent still ideally should not be granted in such a
situation. By hypothesis, the invention would have been invented soon anyway, and
any patent will produce at least some deadweight loss. But that is not so clear. The
patent may at least slightly accelerate invention, providing benefits that may offset
deadweight loss. Moreover, cost recovery may promote efficiency. The inducement
test assesses whether existing firms in an industry would have had incentives to
invent. But this ignores incentives to enter into the industry in the first place. A
company is more likely to enter into an industry if it expects to be able to recover a
category of its costs than if it does not. The law does not generally seek to deny
producers the ability to pass along their costs to consumers.
Blocking windfall damages is not the only function of the nonobviousness
doctrine. Perhaps the nonobviousness doctrine serves as a carrot that leads some
inventors to make more significant contributions than they otherwise would. 140
Meanwhile, perhaps some inventions might be so trivial that they would not be
closed even absent the inducement of a patent.
118 See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 12, at 1596 (aspiring to "revitalize the inducement standard
as the touchstone for understanding and refining the obviousness doctrine").
139 Id. at 1599.
140 Cf Michael J. Meurer & Katherine Strandburg, Nonobviousness - The Shape of Things to Come:
Patent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of Nonobviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 547, 549
(2008) ("The nonobviousness threshold may be used as a 'stick' to induce researchers to pursue
more difficult, socially preferred research projects.").
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worth the administrative costs of patentability. But these are second-order
considerations. Many critics of the patent system in the United States view the
relative generosity of the Patent and Trademark Office in granting patents as one of
its chief flaws. 4' This is not an easy problem to solve doctrinally or
administratively. 142 But bad patents that produce only modest rewards seem at least
like a much smaller problem. If patent damages were assessed based on risk-
adjusted costs, the primary function of the nonobviousness doctrine would be
unnecessary, and any administrative deficiencies in enforcing it would be of little
moment.
B. Patent Term
A related benefit of cost-plus patent damages is that it might be unnecessary to
limit the patent term. A primary function of the patent term is to limit the extent to
which a patentee can extract rents from the public. The patent term does this by
allowing the patentee full power over price within the patent term and no power
over price after the patent term. But cost-plus damages provide an alternative
mechanism for restraining power over price. The patentee could collect damages
until risk-adjusted costs were recovered. In setting damages against a particular
defendant, a court might ordinarily assume a collection schedule of duration
comparable to the patent term. But a patentee might choose to charge less and
collect over a longer period of time. Indeed, the patent system might encourage this
by applying a generously high discount in determining cost recoveries.
There are two primary benefits of such a regime. First, Ian Ayres and Paul
Klemperer have argued that longer patents with reduced power over price may
increase welfare relative to shorter patents with greater power over price. 143 The
reason is that the last increment of monopoly pricing places the greatest strain on
deadweight loss. Ayres and Klemperer suggest that probabilistic enforcement of a
patent may be one way to reduce power over price;' 4 restricting damages
recoveries is another. Second, the current patent term may unduly induce incentives
for creating inventions whose benefits will largely accrue after the patent term. The
problem is recognized in the area of pharmaceuticals, where the local clinical trial
process may mean that a patentee gets relatively few years of patent term. 145 The
141 See, e.g., Shawn P. Miller, Where's the Innovation: An Analysis of the Quantity and Qualities of
Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 (2013) (citing ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 8 (Princeton Univ. Press 2004)).
142 See Michael Abramowicz & John Duffy, Ending the Patent Monopoly, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1541,
1546-58 (2009).
143 Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation In-
centives: The Perverse Benefits .of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV.
985, 992-94 (1999).
144 Id.
145 Compare Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals, 19
INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 109-17 (2000) (estimating between ten and twelve years) with Amy
Kapczynski et al., Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of "Sec-
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law partially adjusts for delays in that context, 146 but breakthrough inventions in
many fields take a long time to commercialize. Cost-plus damages would allow
creators of such breakthroughs to recover damages over a longer period of time.
Someone who invested a billion dollars for a technological solution to global
warming would probably not recover the investment, because potential users of the
technology would just wait for it to enter the public domain. 147 Cost-plus damages
would improve the ability of inventors to place long bets.
Like the nonobviousness doctrine, the patent term may have functions besides
reducing the total return to inventors. It may, for example, reduce the nuisance of
administrative costs associated with patents with little economic power. But there
are simpler solutions to this problem, such as insisting on renewal fees so that
patentees would not unnecessarily drag out patent lifetimes.
C. Patentable Subject Matter
Though the issue of cost-plus damages seems distant from the issue of
patentable subject matter, limitations on patentable subject matter can be seen as
reflecting concerns similar to those animating nonobviousness and the patent term.
A principal concern of defenders of patentable subject matter limitations is that
patents on abstract ideas might allow a patentee to obtain control over an entire
field, potentially earning excessive rents and impeding further technological
developments. 148 Meanwhile, some have argued that patentable subject matter
should be used to exclude certain technological fields, such as software, where there
may be considerable incentives to invent even absent patent incentives. 149 If many
patents are granted on relatively trivial inventions in these fields, and if those
patents place a burden on legitimate inventive activity, then a blanket patentable
subject matter ban may be justifiable.
Patentable subject matter doctrine, however, is at best an unfortunate
compromise. If a mathematician can devise a new theorem that has great practical
import, why should that mathematician be any less entitled to a patent than a
biologist or chemist making an equal contribution?15 ° Meanwhile, while software
ondary" Pharmaceutical Patents, 7:e49470 PLoS ONE, Dec. 2012, at 4-5 (arguing that secondary
patents can increase the effective patent term by 6-7 years).
146 See 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (2012).
147 See Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward a New Form of Intellectual Property,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1404 (2011).
148 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611-12 (2010) ("Allowing patent petitioners to patent risk
hedging would preempt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly
over an abstract idea.").
149 See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation In-
centives, 5 U.C. IRVrNE L. REv. 1115, 1138-41 (2015) (discussing the nonpatent incentives for
software innovation).
150 See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 609, 623 (2009) ("[I]t should be a rare situation in which an entire class of patents complies
with the nonobviousness requirement and yet still somehow discourages or impedes the develop-
ment and spread of useful knowledge.").
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technology appears to advance rapidly, it seems plausible that it might advance
more rapidly if there were more theoretical computer scientists. Much of the
software powering modem artificial intelligence applications reflects advances in
algorithms,151 and with greater patent incentives, those advances might have been
made earlier than they were. The same is true of advances in basic research in
biology and life sciences. Government funding of basic research is limited, so if the
patent system could lead to increases in funding, that could increase social welfare.
The challenge is for the patent system to increase incentives in these fields without
risking inventors earning excessive control over a technological field.
At least in theory, cost-plus damages can achieve this goal. A mathematician
(or university or private firm employing mathematicians) would be able to receive
patents for contributions, but the market power that these patents would provide
would be limited. This would have two significant benefits. First, it might help
induce patents on many modest inventions in fields currently beyond the scope of
patentable subject matter. The argument above concerning nonobviousness applies
here; there is no need to filter out small inventions, so long as the return on these
inventions is proportional. Second, eliminating the patentable subject matter hurdle
could allow inventions that are quite significant, albeit not so significant as to entitle
the inventors to injunctive relief or patent damages under traditional formulae.
D. Patent Scope and Infringement
The doctrine of patentable subject matter has long been closely associated with
the doctrine of patent scope. O'Reilly v. Morse,152 for example, can be read either as
a case about whether the telegraph is within patentable subject matter or about
whether Samuel Morse claimed more than he had invented.'53 Patent scope is one of
the most challenging areas of patent doctrine conceptually, because there are no
obvious conceptual limiting principles. Should Morse have received a patent only
on the particular mechanism that he devised, or, as he sought, on the use of
electromagnetism "however developed for marking or printing intelligible
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances"? 154 If a patent is too narrow, it might
be too easy for others to free-ride on the inventor's contribution by changing the
invention slightly; if a patent is too broad, then an inventor may receive a windfall
beyond the contribution provided. The only way to answer this question in a
particular context is to consider the specifics of the inventive contribution, but in
our current system it is hard to give much more concrete guidance than that.
A working cost-plus damages system would make it feasible to grant broad
patent scope without granting powerful monopoly rights. An inventor like Morse
151 See, e.g., Image Assessment Using Deep Convolutional Neural Networks, U.S. Patent No.
9,536,293 (issued Jan. 3, 2017).
152 O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854).
'5 See Aaron J. Zakem, Rethinking Patentable Subject Matter: Are Statutory Categories Useful?, 30
CARDOZO L. REv 2983, 2991-92 (2009).
154 O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 112.
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would be entitled, like any other, to receive his risk-adjusted returns on an invention
that could not have been made without the insight that he provided. As this
formulation suggests, patent law would no longer need to require inventors to
engage in "peripheral claiming" wherein they carefully identify the metes and
bounds of their invention.155 The patent system could instead return to a system of
central claiming. That does not mean that patents would have no bounds at all. The
courts should be sure that an inventor was the first to have an insight represented by
a central claim and that this insight was indeed necessary to the allegedly infringing
product. But in principle, multiple inventors who contributed key insights could
each receive patents on different related insights. In today's patent system, having a
large number of patents that read on broad categories of technology can lead to
inefficient royalty stacking.156 But in a well-functioning cost-plus damages system,
each contributor would be limited in what he or she could collect.
This utopian vision should not be confused with an endorsement. My
discussion is predicated on the premise that the cost-plus damages system is well
functioning. Yet in Part II.A, we identified concerns-that cost-plus damages might
undercompensate if permissible returns are set too low and that inventors might
spend excessively in anticipation of a significant return on investment. It is easy to
imagine these problems ruining our utopian patent system. If returns were set too
low, Morse might have found another line of work. And if anyone could claim an
insight central to later inventions, many inventors might have unnecessarily fancy
offices and unnecessarily large salaries, contributing very small insights that others
easily could have obtained without a patent. To address this, we would need to
require patentees to limit their patent scope carefully. Indeed, if the problems are
sufficiently severe, we might need to keep many features of the patent system
designed to prevent inventors from receiving excess rents. We thus return to these
problems to try to gauge their scope.
IV. Modeling Cost-Plus Damages
In principle, cost-plus damages can be implemented by allocating every
expense by an inventor across all projects the inventor is undertaking, estimating the
distribution of returns that the inventor would have expected in the traditional patent
system at the time of each expense, determining the inventor's internal rate of return
at the time of each expense, identifying a range of outcomes in which the inventor
would earn more than was needed to incentivize the investments ex ante, and finally
determining what rate of return should be allowed in those cases to ensure that the
inventor would have had just enough incentives. We can further complicate the
analysis by accounting for the distribution of possible measurement errors that the
inventor or the court might make in assessing amounts, allocations, or probabilities.
155 See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark. A. Lemnley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction?, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1743, 1748-49 (2009).
156 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 22, at 2047.
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This is too complicated. As Part II.A's critique of Brennan et al.'s and
Sichelman's proposals indicated, it is difficult even to conceptualize how to
calculate risk-adjusted returns, and such calculations would be even more difficult
in practice to get exactly right. Any attempt to implement cost-plus damages is thus
likely to require some crude approximation. Probably it will be infeasible to
determine the risk associated with investments in creating a firm, since it will be
difficult to allocate these investments among all past and future projects. At best, a
court can estimate costs actually incurred for a particular research project and the
risk associated with that project. Rather than attempt to determine the exact internal
rate of return necessary to compensate investors, it will likely be more feasible
simply to specify a permissible rate of return and to set that large enough to
overcome the failure to include early stage costs.
The question is whether such a strategy can succeed. The government must set
the permissible rate of return not so low that it thwarts investments and not so high
that it generates excessive expenditures. Is it even plausible that there exists some
permissible rate of return that would increase social welfare? And if so, how
difficult might it be for the government to identify that rate of return? The ultimate
challenge for the government is one of calibration. This paper's goal is not to
perform that calibration, a task that, if achievable at all, would require a great deal
of empirical work. Rather, the goal is to develop an approximate sense of how
different parameters will affect social welfare and how precise the government will
need to be in its calibration if it ultimately seeks to adopt a regime of cost-plus
damages.
A. Analytical Model
We will begin with a simple analytical model. Assume that there is a fixed cost
to research c, producing a probability p of a successful invention. Success results in
an invention valued by users at v. Assume that standard damages will equal v, and
the inventor is able to extract the full surplus of the value, thus receiving v. Thus,
the ex ante expectation of revenue is pv, and the inventor will engage in research so
long as c < pv.
With cost-plus damages, assume that the inventor can recover
min(v, (1 + r)kc). Thus, r represents the permitted rate of return, and k > 1 if the
courts will overvalue costs and k < 1 if the courts will undervalue costs. Note that
the recovery will never be greater than v, because if the inventor set a price greater
than v, then users will not use the invention. So, expected damages is
min(pv, p(l + r)kc). If c > pv, then c > min(pv, p(l + r)kc), so, just as with standard
damages, the inventor will not invent. If c < pv, then c will invent so long as
c <p(l + r)kc, i.e., I/p < (1 + r)k. This reflects that the rate of return r must be
sufficient to compensate both for the risk associated with the possibility of research
failure and also for any undervaluation of costs.
This highlights the primary effects of cost-plus damages placing aside
concerns about excessive investment. If the rate of return r is set too low, then the
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inventor will not undertake research even in cases in which it would have been
socially optimal (and also privately optimal with standard damages) to do so. But if
the inventor does invent, then the amount paid to the inventor is reduced from v to
p(l + r)kc, which is less than or equal to v in cases in which invention occurs.
Suppose, however, that the inventor can choose c, producing a probability of
success p(c), where p' (c) > 0 and p" (c) < 0. That is, the inventor can spend more
than the minimal amount needed to complete the invention, resulting in an increased
probability of completing the invention but with decreasing marginal returns. With
standard damages, an inventor will set c to maximize p(c)v - c, i.e., where p'(c) = 1.
This is the point where both the marginal benefit of additional spending (from both
the private and social perspectives, since the inventor is assumed to be able to
extract the user's full value) equals the marginal cost.
But with cost-plus damages, the inventor will optimize
min(p(c)v,p(c)(1 + r)kc) - c. Assume that p(c) = m/(1 + r) where m is some
constant, i.e., that the permissible rate of return is expected to vary proportionately
with the probability of invention. Then, the inventor is optimizing mkc - c. If
mk > 1, then the inventor will set c so that mkc = p(c)v, i.e., up to the point where
the inventor receives the same amount as the inventor would receive with standard
damages. This is a worse outcome from a social perspective since damages are no
lower but expenditures are higher.
This analytical model identifies the fundamental promise and dangers of cost-
plus damages. But it is simplified in important respects. Critically, it imagines just
one inventor. This ignores both the dynamics of entry when some entry costs are not
likely to be reimbursed and the dynamics of rent-dissipating entry. A more realistic
environment would include multiple potential inventors, each with its own estimate
of the value of the invention and with varying costs of successful invention.
Modeling many potential heterogeneous inventors is likely to be analytically
intractable.
B. Simulation Model
Thus, we will turn to a simulation model that will allow for us to better
estimate the implications of different parameter values. Simulations are helpful
when the goal is to develop back-of-the-envelope calculations rather than to prove
that under some assumptions, certain results will necessarily obtain. The purpose of
this exercise is not to prove that cost-plus damages can or cannot work, but rather to
test the sensitivity of a cost-plus damages regime to various parameters. Because a
simulation makes it easy to plug in potential parameter values and see how that
affects welfare outcomes, it is an appropriate tool for this project.
1. The Patent Damages Game
To describe the model, we will first explain the game that our computerized
agents are playing and then describe the optimization protocol.
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a. Game Structure
The model that follows is independent of the analytical model in Part IV.A,
replacing its notation and assumptions. The extensive form game that we are
modeling is one in which inventors first choose whether to enter into a market and
later choose whether to attempt to create a particular invention, and if so, how much
to invest in the effort. The justification for this approach is to reflect that one reason
to create a firm capable of innovating is that doing so will provide later
opportunities for innovation. In a more realistic model, a single entering firm might
consider a wide range of opportunities over time and allocate its assets to working
on the most attractive opportunities, and firms would survive or fail depending on
their success. With our model, the cost of entry can be thought of as the proportion
of the cost of entering a market that can be allocated to a particular opportunity that
presents itself.
Assume that an inventor has initial wealth WO. The inventor must choose
whether to enter the market and pay an entry cost ce. This choice is made solely on
the basis of how many other inventors have so far decided to enter. Once entry is
complete, an investment opportunity presents itself. The opportunity is to attempt to
make an invention. For an average inventor to attempt the invention will require the
inventor to spend a minimum of sain, where Smnn is drawn from a uniform
distribution (0, s). For a particular inventor i, the minimum amount is SiSmin, where si
is drawn from a uniform distribution between 0.5 and 1.5. That is, inventors will
differ in the cost efficiency of their inventive efforts, so inventors who can
accomplish an invention at low cost will be more likely to make an attempt than
inventors with high costs. An inventor who invents can choose mi where m- > 1. The
inventor's total spending will be miSiSmin.
The probability that an inventor succeeds in making an invention is
parameterized by three values, pi (representing the probability of success with a
minimum investment), P2 (representing the probability of success with an
investment of twice the minimum), and plo (representing the probability of success
with an investment of ten times the minimum, which is the maximum permitted).
We will define p(m), the probability for a particular spending level, as a curve
between these three points. More concretely, let k = In(1/9)/(ln(p2 -PI) / ln(p 3 -pl)).
Then, for a particular m, p(m) = pi + (p3 -pl)*(((m - 1)/9)1/)). Note that p(m) is the
same for all inventors, but because s varies across inventors, two inventors
spending the same amount have different probabilities of success. If more than one
inventor succeeds at invention, the patent is granted to one of the succeeding
inventors chosen at random (using a pseudo-random number generator).
The invention is embodied in a product that sells for zero marginal cost. The
demand for the product is linear, and the highest amount any potential user values
the product is v/n, where n represents the total number of potential users and v is
drawn from a uniform distribution from the interval (0, LI). We can thus think of v
as the total utility that all potential users would receive from the invention if
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everyone who valued the invention at all valued it as much as the highest valuing
user. Because demand is linear, the average utility for a potential user is v/(2n).
Each inventor i receives only a signal of v, namely v + 6j, where 6i is drawn
from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation a. Each userj knows
that its utility from the product would be ujv/n, where 0 < uj < 1. Based on this
signal, the inventor calculates vi = E(v), drawing valid Bayesian inferences
considering the distributions of v and 6. Each inventor thus has a valid but noisy
estimate of the highest valuation.
An inventor i who wins the patent chooses a where 0 < a < 1 and offers the
product for sale to users at a price I = avi. (Note that we are assuming that the
inventor cannot price discriminate but must offer a single price to all users.) Each
user may choose to accept this price, to infringe the patent, or to not use the product.
If the user accepts the price, the product is sold at this price, and the inventor is
assumed to collect all the revenue. If the user infringes, then a court chooses P3 to
produce a court-ordered price of C = ive. When intentional infringement occurs,
each side bears a litigation cost cl, so a userj with valuation ujv/n receives a benefit
of ujv/n - C - cl, and the inventor earns revenues of C - cl. We define vc to be the
court's estimate of the valuation of the highest valuing user based on the court's
own signal of v drawn from a distribution with the same standard deviation as the
inventor's. Thus, a user with valuation ujv/n will infringe if I > ujv/n - C - c, > 0,
i.e., if intentional infringement is cheaper than paying the offered price and is better
than not using the product at all. A user who does not infringe will pay if I < ujv/n.
Note that because users know v, it will never be the case that some users infringe
while other users pay. If the inventor prices sufficiently high, then some users will
infringe while others will not use the product; otherwise, some users may pay the
price while others will not use the product.
The approach that the court takes in setting /3 and thus C depends on the legal
regime. In the standard damages frame, the court chooses f = 0.5. If vc = v, then this
is the profit-maximizing price that the inventor would choose if the inventor had
perfect information. In the cost-plus damages frame, the court sets j8 so that
C = (1 + r)msis,,,vp', where r represents the permitted rate of return and p'
represents the ex ante probability that eventual patent winner inventor i would win
the patent. Note that if there was only one inventor, then p'= p(mi). Where multiple
inventors attempt to complete an invention, the simulation calculates p' by using an
algorithm that takes into account each investor's investment and probability of
winning, as well as the randomization of the patent to one of the winning inventors.
For example, if r = 0.5 and an inventor invests $1,000,000 producing a 0.2 chance
of ultimately receiving the patent, then the inventor will receive $7,500,000. Note
that cost-plus damages thus reward the inventors' investments in attempting to
invent, but not investments in initially entering the market.
Given a set of investment decisions, the pricing decision of the winning
patentee (if any), and the potential court's valuation, it is straightforward to estimate
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the final wealth of the patentee, wj, and the combined utility of all users. We assume
that the patentee and users are risk neutral and that private welfare Wprv can
properly be represented as the sum of the users' utilities plus the change in each
inventor's wealth. We further define social welfare W as Wpiv + Ov, where the Ov
represents a spillover from invention that cannot be captured by the users or the
patentee.
b. Optimization Protocol
Many of the parameters in the patent damages game can either be set as
constant settings that are inputs into the optimization process or calculated on the
fly as the game proceeds. For example, the users' decisions whether to infringe and
the court's decision in cases in which infringement occurs can be simulated without
need for any optimization. We also assume that the inventor sets
a = min(O.5, E(C)/vi). That is, with standard damages, the inventor sets a to the
profit-maximizing level conditional on v = vi. With cost-plus damages, the inventor
sets a to the inventor's best estimate of 8, unless this is greater than the profit
maximizing level of 0.5. Given these assumptions, only the inventor's decisions
whether to enter the market and whether to invest need to be optimized.
An inventor i who has entered the market is assumed to decide on a value mi c
{O}lU{x I 1 < x < 10}. In making this decision, the inventor has several pieces of
information besides inputs to the optimization process: the number of inventors who
have entered the market (some of whom also may choose to try to invent), si, Smin,
and vi. We optimize separately the decision whether to try at all (i.e., whether
mi = 0) and how much to try conditional on mi - 1. The optimization process occurs
over ten rounds; in each round, first the decision whether to try at all is optimized,
and then the decision of how hard to try is optimized. Each round results in a
strategy that chooses for the first potential entrant the investment amount that is
expected to lead to the maximum score for any given set of inputs. All potential
entrants but the first use the strategy that is the result of the optimization in the
previous round, except in the first round, where all potential entrants but the first
play m. = 0. Using ten rounds allows the strategies to converge so that the strategy
from the tenth round is quite close to the strategy resulting from the ninth round.
(Qualitative results were the same when running the simulation over a smaller or
larger number of rounds.)
To perform each optimization in a single round, a neural network optimization
process is used. The neural network optimization process is described in more detail
in a separate article concerning a different model,157 but a capsule summary will be
provided here: The game is played a large number of times (up to 25,000), with the
first entrant choosing mo drawn at random from the permissible values (with all
values between 0 and 1 converted to 0). A general regression neural network is
... See generally Mina Niknafs, Neural Network Optimization 1 (Feb. 6, 2016) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://courses.mai.liu.se/FU/MAI0083/ReportMinaNikanfs.pdf.
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constructed based on the plays of the game, where the inputs for each play of the
game are si, Srin, vi, and mo, and the output is the final wealth of the first potential
entrant, wf The general regression neural network thus can produce a predicted
score for each potential investment amount, given a set of inputs. The optimization
process thus selects the maximum possible predicted score for each set of inputs.
The simulation can be conducted either by fixing the number of entrants at one
or by optimizing the number of entrants given the optimization of the decisions on
how much to invest. Fixing the number at one is useful for assessing the static
effects of a change in patent damages on a single potential inventor; optimizing the
number makes it possible to also consider how patent damages may affect entry into
the market. Because the optimization of spending amounts takes into account how
many firms have entered into the market, it is straightforward to optimize the
number of entrants. The simulation plays the game a large number of times to
estimate E(wf) with just one entrant. If this is less than wO, then we assume that no
firms will enter the market and thus no inventions will be produced. In this case,
Ws, = Wp, = 0. Otherwise, the simulation plays the game repeatedly to determine
the number of entrants n to make E(wf) as close to wO as possible. This reflects the
standard assumption in the industrial organization literature that entry will dissipate
all rents.158 If entering would earn an inventor positive economic profits, then entry
would occur until those profits were dissipated. Note that the simulation allows
fractional entry. For example, if the entry that dissipates profits is 1.5, then there
will be a 0.5 probability of one entrant and a 0.5 probability of two entrants. In any
play of the game, those who enter choose how much, if any, to invest in invention.
2. Single Entrant Model
To facilitate exposition of the results, we will start with a simplified version of
the model. In this version, we assume that the number of entrants is fixed at one,
i.e., that the entry-optimizing step is skipped. In other words, we imagine that a
particular inventive opportunity is presented to a single firm. If that firm does not
try to invent or does not succeed in an attempt, then the invention does not occur
and no users enjoy any surplus from the invention. We repeat the entire
optimization process once for the standard damages frame and a number of times
under the cost-plus damages frame for different values of r. The goal is to see how
changing the value of r will affect investments, the likelihood of invention, and
private and social welfare.
For each of the optimizations, we set various parameters to specific values.
While plausible values are chosen, it is worth emphasizing that the purpose is not to
calibrate the model closely to the actual patent process. Rather, the goal is to assess
the sensitivity of the model to r. If the success of cost-plus damages proves to be
highly sensitive to r, we know that there is at least a risk that the government will
158 See Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM &
MARY L. REv. 33, 51 (2004).
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not set the appropriate value of r, and because the other parameters in this Article
may not be accurate, this Article cannot be seen as a definitive source for
determining the optimal value of r if cost-plus damages were to be enacted. If cost-
plus damages are successful across a wide range of r values, that should give us
some confidence that cost-plus damages have potential, but can hardly be viewed as
a conclusive demonstration for any particular value of r.
We have set the parameters as follows. We assume that _V = 10 and that a = 1.
We normalize n to 1. One might consider this to mean that if all users had the
valuation of the highest valuing user, then in the average run of the simulation they
would be willing to pay in total up to $5,000,000 for the invention. Meanwhile, s =
0.5, representing the top of the distribution from which the cost for the average
inventor is drawn. The cost of litigation cl = 0.1. We have set 0 = 1.0 so that we can
consider social welfare in a world with high spillovers.
We will start with a baseline simulation, for which we have set p1, P2, and P3 to
0.75, 0.8, and 0.9, respectively. In other words, the minimum investment produces a
75% chance of success, but higher levels of investment add only incrementally to
success. These are arbitrary values-some inventions in the real world are much
easier, some are harder-and we will deviate from this baseline to assess the
robustness of the model later. Meanwhile, in this baseline, we begin with an
assumption that the inventor knows the value of the invention. That is, ayn = 0, so for
each 1, vi = v, = v. This is not a perfect information assumption, however, because
the neural network optimization is necessarily imperfect. The neural network
optimization figures out the "optimum" based on other, similar cases. It does not
permit the inventor to calculate the exact amount of investment that would
maximize its welfare.
We can now compare outcomes, including social welfare results, for standard
damages and cost-based damages with different permitted rates of return given
these baseline parameters. Consider first the spending multiple, i.e., the average
value of m excluding those who set m = 0. This thus represents the amount spent by
each inventor divided by the minimum spending amount. Even with standard
damages, this amount is greater than 1, reflecting that at least in some situations
(especially when the invention is estimated to be highly demanded), the inventor
finds it optimal to invest more than the minimum to increase the probability of
succeeding with invention. But the spending multiple is much greater for cost-plus
damages. This is illustrated in the second panel of the top row of Figure 1. With
cost-plus damages, greater investments allow greater recoveries, and so inventors
invest much more, even though with our parameters, the marginal increase in the
probability of invention from additional investment is relatively low.
There is some limit to gold-plating even with cost-plus damages. This is so for
two reasons. First, users have an option besides paying damages. They can simply
decide not to use the patented invention. Greater cost-plus damages limit the
likelihood that users will be willing to engage in intentional infringement, and they
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thus increase the inventors' ability to charge close to the profit-maximizing price.
But an inventor will not want to charge more than the profit-maximizing price (the
same price charged in the standard damages model), so at some point, the benefits
to gold-plating are reduced. Second, as permitted rates of return rise, there may be
less need for gold-plating. If one can recover 400% of one's investment, then the
investment need not be high to charge as much as one wants. This explains why the
spending multiple gradually declines as the permitted rate of return increases.
Figure 1. Baseline (Single Entrant)
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Because increased spending multiples increase the probability of invention,
gold-plating has potential benefits. But in the model represented by Figure 1, with
relatively low permitted rates of return, invention occurs less often with cost-plus
damages than with standard damages. Because the effect of cost-plus damages is to
restrict the inventor's ability to charge the profit-maximizing price, the inventor
perceives a risk of spending more than can be recovered. Thus, the inventor is
somewhat less likely to try to invent at all. With standard damages, an attempt to
invent occurs 86% of the time, but with a permitted return of 20%, it occurs only
78% of the time. With higher permitted rates of return, the constraint on the
inventor's pricing is reduced, and so the inventor is roughly as likely to try to invent
as with standard damages. In Figure 1, once the permitted rate of return is
approximately 80%, the effect of the spending multiple dominates, and the rate of
invention is generally at least as much as with cost-plus damages.
Figure 1 also shows the effect on price and on the proportion of potential users
who ultimately use an invention. The use metric is not conditional on invention, so
when no invention occurs, that is counted as zero use. As one would expect, price is
highest with standard damages, considerably higher than with a low permitted rate
of return. As the permitted rate of return rises, damages increase, and price
increases accordingly, though never higher than the amount that can be received
with standard damages. Under the parameters represented by Figure 1, even though
cost-plus damages slightly decrease the rate of invention with a low permitted rate
of return, the increase in use conditional on invention results in more users using the
invention overall. With high permitted rates of return, the higher prices mean that
use returns closer to the level associated with standard damages.
The welfare consequences of this are also illustrated in Figure 1. User welfare
is especially high with a low permitted rate of return. As the permitted rate of return
rises, user welfare declines, but it still remains consistently above the user welfare
level associated with standard damages. Private welfare takes into account both user
welfare and the inventor's interests. The inventor fares much worse with cost-plus
damages, and thus despite the benefits to users, total private welfare is lower with
low permitted rates of return. Private welfare is greater than with standard damages
once permitted rates of return exceed 100%; at this point, the inventor is only
slightly adversely affected, and users still receive considerable gains. Finally, our
measure of social welfare assumes that mere invention produces spillover effects.
Once the permitted rate of return is sufficiently high that invention rates are not
much affected by cost-plus damages, the combination of higher user welfare and
high rates of invention maximize social welfare.
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Figure 2. Low Probability of Invention (Single Entrant)
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These welfare analyses make cost-plus damages appear promising. To consider
the robustness of the results, we also ran the simulation with some changes in
parameters. Figure 2 shows the effect of increasing the difficulty of invention. The
simulations are the same as those in Figure 1, except that pI, p2, and P3 are set to
0.35, 0.45, and 0.55, respectively. The story remains qualitatively similar to the
story above. Naturally, the overall levels of trying to invent and of succeeding at
invention are lower. But Figure 2 confirms that spending multiples are considerably
higher with cost-plus damages and that this effect continues to dissipate with higher
permitted levels of return. The pricing pattern is similar to that of Figure 1, with the
lowest prices achieved with the lowest permitted rates of return, and the usage
pattern is similar too, with more users able to take advantage of the invention with
cost-plus damages, especially with relatively low rates of return. Very low
permitted rates of return, however, bring a lower probability of invention and lower
welfare overall, but again mostly the same pattern as Figure 1.
In addition, we assess the impact of valuation uncertainty by setting Gn = 1.
This means that potential inventors cannot be sure of the amount that the highest
valuing user is willing to pay, and also that with standard damages, the court may
err in setting this amount. With either form of damages, users (who know their own
valuations) may believe that the inventor has priced the product too high and
therefore choose to infringe. Figure 3 shows that valuation uncertainty makes the
welfare case for cost-plus damages more equivocal. Welfare is lower across the
board, because with valuation uncertainty, intentional infringement and litigation
are more likely, and the cost of litigation is deducted from user welfare. Meanwhile,
when cost-plus damages lead the inventor to decide not to invent, this will
sometimes be because the inventor is greatly underestimating the value of the
invention. Thus, some foregone inventions will be valuable, and a small decrease in
the probability of invention thus makes a bigger difference.
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Figure 3. Valuation Uncertainty (Single Entrant)
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3. Racing Model
Our models so far have assumed that there is a single firm that considers
whether to invent. This places to the side two important aspects of the analysis.
First, we have ignored the question of whether a firm would have an incentive to
enter the industry in the first place. Now, we assume that firms choose whether to
enter the industry for the opportunity to compete for the invention. Second, we have
ignored the effect of competition among multiple firms for invention. When
multiple firms compete to invent, the probability of the invention's occurrence
increases. Our racing model is simple. Consistent with the standard assumption in
the industrial organization literature,159 the number of entrants into the market will
be the number that dissipates all rents to entrants. All entrants have an opportunity
to decide whether to try to invent, based on both shared and private information,
and if multiple entrants succeed, one chosen at random obtains the patent.
We start first with the analogue to Figure 1. That is, this is the baseline model
in which the probability of invention for a successful invention is relatively high,
0.75. The cost of entry ce is assumed to be 0.05. This may seem so low as to be
insignificant, but we will see later that this choice is critical in assessing social
welfare. Figure 4 shows the results. Entry is highest with standard damages, because
there is the least restraint on pricing. This also means that the level of invention is
highest with standard damages. In Figure 4, the "Trying" chart represents the
number of firms that try to invent. In Figure 1, the single entrant was less likely to
try to invent with cost-plus damages and low permitted rates of return. In Figure 4,
the shape of the chart is similar, though the effect now is a direct result of the entry
chart. Not every entrant will try to invent, but the relative low number of firms
trying to invent in Figure 4 is attributable to reduced entry in those cases. Finally,
the overall levels of invention are higher than in Figure 1. The more firms that try to
invent, the greater the likelihood of success. Meanwhile, the advantage of standard
damages in stimulating invention is slightly more pronounced as a result. There is
more entry with standard damages because the profits available to inventors are
greater, and this leads to more invention.
The effects on price and use are similar to those in Figure 1, though muted.
Welfare effects are also qualitatively similar. (Note that because entry dissipates
rents, private welfare is equal to user welfare, and the separate chart for private
welfare is thus omitted.) The social welfare gains, however, are more prominent in
Figure 4 with low permitted rates of return. This is because of the rent dissipation.
The positive rents earned by a single entrant affected the social welfare measure in
Figure 1, but those are irrelevant in Figure 4.
159 See, e.g., id. at 50-51.
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Figure 4. Baseline (Racing)
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Figure 5 is the analogue to Figure 2. Figure 5 reflects a simulation in which a
minimum investment produces only a 0.35 probability of successful invention. For
the most part, the simulation results are qualitatively similar. But there is one
noticeable difference: the bars corresponding to the 20% level of permitted return
are missing. This absence reflects that at this level of return, it is not worth it for
even a single firm to enter the market. Above, we noted that if inventors anticipate
that they will not recover their risk-adjusted investments in attempting to invent,
they will not invent at all. In our model, the inventors do recover their investments
associated with the attempt to invent itself. (Our model simply assumes that the
courts are accurate in measuring the probability of success.) But the inventors do
not necessarily recover their investments in building a business that may be in a
position to undertake the invention. Therefore, they may not build that business in
the first place. This is what happens in these simulations. The rate of return is great
enough to allow recovery of investments conditional on entry but not great enough
to allow recovery of investments on entry itself.
Figure 6 adds an additional change to the simulation represented in Figure 5. In
particular, the cost of entry is assumed to be $0.10 instead of $0.05. This may seem
to be a very modest difference, especially considering that there may be users who
value an invention at as much as $10. But this change has an important effect. Now,
entry also fails to occur at a permitted rate of return as high as 80%. Intuitively, it
might seem that an 80% rate of return is generous, especially considering that our
model does not take into account discount rates associated with the time value of
money. This might seem especially so given that the portion of the cost of entry
allocated to the investment opportunity ($0.10) is considerably smaller than the
average cost of a minimal attempt to produce the invention ($0.25). Even under
these circumstances, the rate of return proves insufficient, and so all user welfare
and social welfare that could have resulted from invention is lost. Even with higher
rates of return, the effects of reduced entry are considerable. User welfare is only
slightly higher than with standard damages, and the reduced incidence of successful
invention drags social welfare below the level associated with standard damages
until the permitted rate of return rises to approximately 120%.
Finally, we consider one other situation in which cost-plus damages are
especially problematic: when users may infringe inadvertently. In Figure 7, the
baseline parameters are reproduced but 10% of users infringe accidentally, without
any calculus of whether using the invention might be beneficial. This scenario does
not discourage entry-to the contrary. The existence of users who will have no
choice but to infringe greatly increases entry and effort. There are benefits to this, of
course, in the form of high entry. But the effects on users are disastrous. For all
cost-plus damages levels, users experience negative utility. They are forced to pay
damages in excess of the valuation of the products. Importantly, while inadvertent
infringement is undesirable even with standard damages, the effect on user welfare
2018]
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Figure 5. Low Probability of Invention (Racing)
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Figure 6. High Entry Cost, Low Probability of Invention (Racing)
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Figure 7. Inadvertent Infringement (Racing)
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with standard damages is slight. This makes sense. If the damages the user must pay
are tied to the court's estimate of the user's valuation of the invention, the user will
suffer relatively little harm on average other than the cost of litigation. But if the
user is responsible for paying risk-adjusted costs that may exceed the user's own
valuation, users may end up much worse off. The result is much lower social
welfare, despite the increase in the rate of invention. Thus, a cost-plus damages
system would need to eliminate or greatly limit damages resulting from inadvertent
infringement.
4. Modified Proposals
a. Hybrid Damages
We have assumed so far that the choice between cost-plus damages and
standard damages is all-or-nothing. This is a useful assumption for assessing the
potential effects of introducing cost-plus considerations into the patent damages
calculus, but we can imagine a patent damages system in which risk-adjusted R&D
levels are merely another factor in the calculus. Indeed, this is what Sichelman
suggests. Figure 8 reports the result of a simulation that replicates the challenging
circumstances represented in Figure 6-with high entry costs and a low probability
of invention-but with hybrid damages. In particular, we assume that damages are
the average of standard damages and the specified level of cost-plus damages.
Importantly, the disastrous results that we saw in Figure 6, with low permitted rates
of return, vanish. Entry occurs in all cases (though presumably if the rate of return
were sufficiently low, it would not). Meanwhile, there are some benefits to user
welfare, but more modest than in some of the simulations above. The social welfare
results, meanwhile, are equivocal at best because of the reduced rate of invention
once cost-plus damages are introduced. Nonetheless, this suggests that including
risk-adjusted R&D as a factor in the patent damages calculus is unlikely to lead to
major problems.
b. Combined Investments
One of the two major problems with cost-plus damages that this article
identifies is the risk that inventors will gold-plate, spending excessively to pad their
costs and increase the amount of damages. A potential solution for this is to seek to
transform risk-adjusted R&D costs to be more of a measure of expected risk-
adjusted R&D costs. We will consider below whether it may be feasible for courts
to assess how much an invention should cost. But there is another possible
mechanism. Courts might consider the R&D costs of all competitors in the patent
race, rather than the R&D costs of the winner alone. With multiple entrants, this
will be a higher amount, but the risk-adjusted amount will not necessarily be larger.
The relevant probability becomes the probability that someone will succeed, not just
2018]
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Figure 8. Hybrid Damages, High Cost of Entry, Low Probability of Invention
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Figure 9. Combined R&D
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the probability that the particular inventor will succeed. Placing aside for now
questions about whether courts can measure combined R&D, how would this affect
welfare?
Figure 9 reports the results from running the simulation in this way. The most
noticeable change is in the spending multiple. Unsurprisingly, when other
competitors' investments help determine the risk adjustment, one will spend less.
But the overall welfare effects are equivocal. User welfare and social welfare are
not much changed. One reason for this is that with combined investments, entry
rises. With a lower optimal cost of invention, more firms will try to invent. Thus,
the savings from lower investment in invention by an inventor is more or less
balanced by additional costs from entry.
The ultimate welfare balance will depend on the specific parameters. If
additional investment generated greater gains in the probability of invention for any
particular inventor than is allowed here (remember that our probability curves are
relatively flat), then basing cost-plus damages on the successful inventor is probably
optimal. On the other hand, if multiple research efforts are likely to be duplicative
because there is only one way to try to achieve the invention, then the entry that is
generated by combining investments is wasteful.
V. Conclusion
Cost-plus damages are high beta: if problems could be addressed, this
approach to damages could revolutionize patent law. It addresses a fundamental
problem with patent law, the danger that an inventor will obtain rents that are too
large to the detriment of consumers. Other patent law doctrines, such as
nonobviousness, the patent term, patentable subject matter, and patent scope, can be
seen as mechanisms designed to address the same fundamental problem. And so, if
cost-plus damages worked, these doctrines could be either unnecessary or at least
not so critical. Those who worry that the patent office grants too many bad patents
need worry no more, for a bad patent is typically a trivial one, which deserves at
most a small reward. Cost-plus damages provide that small reward and restrict the
patentee from receiving more.
The problem is that cost-plus damages might be miscalibrated. It is likely to be
impossible to allocate all investment expenses across all projects. The much more
plausible approach is to allow the inventor to recover expenses devoted to a
particular project plus some percentage. Even this is difficult, since a single project
may lead to multiple patents, but the risk adjustment can in principle be applied to
these patents in combination. If the permitted rate of return is too small, then many
inventors who might have invented might choose not to invent at all, because they
anticipate earning back less than their risk-adjusted returns. The percentage must at
least be large enough so that even if the courts are infected with hindsight bias,
inventors will still expect the probability estimates to be high enough so that they
will expect to make a profit on inventions that increase social welfare. But even this
is not the whole of the undercompensation danger. The permitted rate of return must
[Vol. 26:133
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be high enough to allow businesses to recover the risk-adjusted costs of entry into
those businesses. We have seen that even with seemingly low entry costs and
seemingly high rates of return (as high as 80%), in some circumstances potential
inventors will simply not enter the market and will never even consider invention.
Miscalibrating permitted rates of return might have little effect in the short term, but
in the long term could lead to greatly reduced entry.
A large permitted rate of return brings its own problems. This is especially true
if there is a danger of inadvertent infringement. If cost-plus damages are to have any
role in patent law, they would need to accommodate inadvertent infringers. For
example, the law might provide that a good faith patent search provides immunity
from liability. Or, less drastically, an inadvertent infringer might be allowed to opt
for standard damages instead of cost-plus damages. This would reduce the incentive
to invent for the purpose of mouse-trapping inadvertent infringers. Some of the
criticisms of nonpracticing entities today suggest that they may seek to make their
patents as inaccessible as possible in the hope of catching inadvertent infringers.160
If these criticisms have any validity, the problem may become all that much more
severe with cost-plus damages.
Even if the rate of return is set correctly, excessive spending by inventors will
be a concern. The model of Part IV shows that in some conditions, cost-plus
damages may improve social welfare even when inventors spend on invention many
times more than they would spend in a world with patent damages. Nonetheless, if
it were possible to discourage gold-plating, that could increase the attractiveness of
cost-plus damages considerably. Perhaps the courts can simply determine how
much the inventor should have spent on invention. But given that greater spending
will generally increase the probability of invention, it will be difficult for the courts
to do this with any accuracy, and shortchanging inventors may have the same
adverse consequences as setting the rate of return unduly low.
Perhaps if the patent system was built entirely around cost-plus damages, some
of these problems might be overcome. We have seen that spending declines
markedly when the relevant spending is that of all inventors. In the present patent
system, one doubts that it would be feasible for the courts to obtain data on all
inventors. One could imagine a different system, however, in which inventors could
receive risk-adjusted, cost-plus damages only on spending registered with the patent
agency at the time of disbursement with clear indication of what the spending would
be dedicated to. This data could be made public, so it could be used in intentional
infringement litigation. Such a registry might also facilitate the calculation of risk.
In principle, one could allow the public to make bets in prediction markets on the
probability that the invention attempt would be successful.161 This would provide
160 See Oskar Liivak & Eduardo Penalver, The Right Note to Use in Property and Patent Law, 98
CORNELLL. REv. 1437, 1448 (2013).
161 See generally MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY xirx (2007) (explaining how prediction
markets work and how they could be used for public policy purposes).
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the courts with contemporaneous evidence of risk-adjusted returns, saving the
courts from the challenge of hindsight bias. One could even imagine such a registry
being used to limit excessive entry, allocating rights to enter to inventors with a
high chance of success and a willingness to accept a low rate of return. 
162
But this would be a patent system quite different from the one that we have
now, introducing its own set of challenges. We cannot get to this patent system
without at least some much more modest experimentation with cost-plus damages.
For now, there is likely to be little danger in allowing cost-plus damages to be a
small factor in the patent analysis. We have seen that the worst dangers of cost-plus
damages do not emerge under some assumptions even when cost-plus damages are
as much as half of the patent damages calculus. Such experimentation could allow
assessment of how feasible it is to calculate risk-adjusted costs and perhaps to
determine whether gold-plating is occurring. This would not be easy to measure, but
a slight change in policy could provide a natural experiment that might make
changes over time apparent. Should cost-plus damages prove relatively tractable,
further experimentation might be warranted.
This analysis also gives some support to Brennan et al.'s eminent domain
proposal. The proposal might make economic sense at least when cost-plus
damages multiples seem especially large and high costs are thus unnecessary. As
long as eminent domain is unlikely ex ante, it seems unlikely to lead to excessive
spending. Yet it is important to be cautious here too. It is expensive and risky to
create a pharmaceutical firm that subsequently might be in a position to complete an
invention, and the costs of entry into the industry must be compensated (yet are very
hard to allocate and calculate). The government ideally would focus not just on
whether the returns seem high relative to investment, but also on whether the
invention depended on an exogenous technological development that suddenly
made a difficult problem relatively easy. These are the cases in which even if some
patent incentive is necessary, the needed incentive might be much lower than it
currently is. By contrast, if in principle the invention could have been developed
earlier using much the same approach, we should assume that the full patent system
was necessary, and eminent domain therefore would not be appropriate.
Returning to the patent system, we might someday follow an analogous
approach. We might allow the defendant an option of choosing cost-plus damages.
But this option would be limited in two ways. First, the defendant would need to
establish that the invention is of marginal nonobviousness, at least when
nonobviousness is interpreted in economic terms. Second, the applicable rate of
return would be set with generous estimates of the risk and generous adjustments
for the reality that entry costs are not easily allocable to particular projects. With
these two rules, it might be possible to isolate cases in which patents are windfalls
162 For a proposal that excessive entry sometimes might be limited by auctioning the right to attempt
to invent in a particular area, see Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races over
Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2007).
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for trivial achievements. This would both discourage excessive entry in such cases
and reduce prices paid by consumers. At the same time, it would minimize the risk
that cost-plus damages might deter inventors from undertaking socially valuable
projects because they expect their risk to be underestimated. Finally, because cost-
plus damages would be the defendant's option, the tendency to spend excessively
might be somewhat reduced.
